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ABSTRACT
Positively Identifying Children as Citizens: 
A Call for Comparable 
Due Process Rights
by
Margot Elizabeth Rudy
Dr. Alan Zundel, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Ethics and Policy Studies 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This work addresses the need for parallel due process rights for children by 
investigating the nature o f juvenile welfare policies that affect abused and neglected 
children by focusing on the Adoption Safe Families Act. Upon the settlement o f the 
U.S., common law from England, known as parens patriae, has governed the juvenile 
justice system. This common law has recognized children are indeed a State interest and 
that a child is a different type o f citizen than an adult. Because children are dependant on 
their parents and not seen as full-fledged citizens, the State has assumed the responsibility 
of ensuring that children live in safe environments. In 1899, the Illinois Juvenile Court 
Act was enacted to protect children entering the system due to abuse, neglect or 
delinquency. Although formed to help and protect children, the 1899 Act has not been 
adopted by every state, and the states that have adopted Juvenile Court Acts have 
disabled child rights more than they have assisted them. Under the Due Process Clause,
111
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all citizens are to be afforded the same protections and procedures under the Constitution, 
but children are not considered full-fledged citizens and therefore they lack these 
important protections; this does not mean that children should not or cannot have due 
process rights. Previous and current methods have failed in the protection o f  child 
welfare as they have used ambiguous terms and political trade-offs to protect undefined 
rights o f children. Currently policies, such as the Adoption Safe Families Act, attempt to 
protect the welfare of children and protect undefined rights by using monetary incentives 
to get agencies to comply with policy provisions and quotas. Children may be considered 
citizens-in-training and therefore they should have parallel due process protections that 
ensure that they will be treated fairly and justly by the state. Children lack the experience 
and rationality that adults have and therefore children are unable to politically participate; 
this affects their level o f representation and due process protections as potential or future 
citizens. It is our duty as adults and representatives o f children to ensure that the juvenile 
justice system is policed by a set of due process protections that are parallel to the 
protections adults have, especially in cases o f State supervision and guardianship. By 
allotting parallel due process protections to abused and neglected children by enacting a 
Dependency Clause for minors, we can ensure that the State will follow procedure in the 
name o f rights protection and not in terms o f balancing budgets or meeting quotas.
IV
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Liberty issues have always been at the center o f American interests. Often adults 
do not consider that children also face liberty issues, such as in cases o f State intervention 
in the lives o f abused and neglected children. Although our current system strives to 
protect the welfare o f abused and neglected children, there seem to be many injustices 
that occur regardless o f State intentions. All children bom in the United States, whether 
they have a family or not, will become full functioning citizens one day. It is our duty as 
full fledged citizens to protect the interests o f our “citizens-in-training” if  we want to 
ensure a healthy and prosperous future for ourselves and our children. Currently abused 
and neglected children encounter several liberty issues while in State custody such as: 
extended stays, high recidivism rates, low standards of care, lack o f knowledge of 
disposition, lack o f contact with family members, and institutionally based living.
Currently, children’s welfare and their legal rights as future citizens have been set 
apart from adult-centered rights through the Illinois Juvenile Court Act o f 1899. This has 
effectually hindered their due process and legal rights protections, especially with regard 
to cases dealing with foster children. The jurisdiction o f children’s legal issues should be 
separate from adults due to their dependency as children, but they are left without the 
privilege o f oversight and review in processing protections within the juvenile welfare 
system. If  the state can take an interest in children by removing children from unsafe
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families, then the responsibility o f the government should be to ensure that children are 
still afforded comparable protections as citizens, while keeping child welfare in mind. 
This paper will expose problems that exist within the past and current child welfare 
system, by first examining the root o f these various problems and then reasonable 
solution based on values o f citizenship will be provided. Our legislative system and 
juvenile justice system attempt to work together under the pretext o f parens patriae by 
separating the venues o f adult and juvenile courts, yet current juvenile policy functions 
by mimicking the very system it has tried to avoid.
Interest in child welfare policy from both the public and politicians has fluxed up 
and down throughout different eras in American history; this has left juvenile justice with 
an unstable foundation. The original intentions o f juvenile justice and child welfare 
policy makers have diverged from the foundations o f their formations. At first, the 
recognition o f child welfare and rights formed from genuine concerns and intentions to 
help and save children, but throughout history child welfare issues have developed into 
political bargaining tools and media spectacles.
Intentions of policy-makers have not always been centered on the interests o f the 
children. Parens patriae has demonstrated State interest in the welfare o f children as 
citizens by intervening in their lives with the pretext of protection o f children’s best 
interests. What has resulted is child welfare policy being formed in the interests o f policy 
makers and lobbyists, not o f children. Such policies have made it difficult for foster care 
to run efficiently in protecting the needs and rights o f children. This, in addition to 
bureaucratic problems within the child welfare system, has resulted in several due 
process rights violations, including: long waits for adversarial proceedings, privacy
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violations, not being notified o f one’s rights, and neglect o f the right to appropriate 
counsel, the right to be heard, the right to fair and equal representation and the right to 
appeal. Ordinarily, when the State uses the power to intrude on a citizen’s privacy it 
becomes a matter protected by Constitutional law, therefore it should be required that 
when the State takes interest in the welfare o f children and their rights, it must be 
comparably legally defined and protected under federal guidelines.
Children are potential citizens, but they are not treated as such because of their 
status as dependants. We must address oversight issues in the representation o f children. 
Plato once questioned, who would police the police? Who is policing the juvenile justice 
system if a portion o f it does not fall under Constitutional protections? Can foster 
children understand their rights and utilize these protections? Maybe, but there should be 
an avenue that sets out to ensure that each facet o f the child welfare system is watched 
over in order to ensure that not one child falls through the cracks.
Children who have been abused or neglected have a high risk of growing up to be 
criminals, drug addicted, or homeless. Connecticut officials have estimated that seventy- 
five per cent o f youths in the state’s criminal justice system were once in foster care. 
Before some children become adults, they make their way through the juvenile justice 
system as “junior criminals” breaking laws before they have a chance to comprehend 
them. A 1991 federal study o f former foster care wards found that twenty-five percent 
had been homeless, forty percent were on public assistance and fifty percent were 
unemployed. It was also was found that eighty percent o f prisoners (four out o f five 
prisoners) in Illinois had spent time in foster care'. These are not the aims nor outcomes
' Rick Thoma, “A Critical Look at the Foster Care System,” Lifting the Veil: Examining the Child Welfare, 
Foster Care and Juvenile Justice Systems, 2002.
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that have been set by Human Services or the Department o f Family and Youth Services, 
nor are they what the American public wants for its foster children. This is not a very 
successful outcome for foster care policies, or for the pocketbooks o f taxpayers who have 
to support foster children not only when they are young, but when they grow up to be 
adults either homeless, dependant on public aid or in correctional facilities. And finally, 
these children’s potential for growth and contribution is stunted or lost.
Today the focus o f growing concerns is child welfare and their Constitutional 
rights such as due process rights. Children in foster care have the least level o f potential 
representation due to the absence o f stable guardians, it is of utmost importance that 
citizens on the lower tier o f representation get the proper representation. The children’s 
rights movement stands apart from other movements o f the past because children are 
categorized as minors under the age o f eighteen, leaving them with less legal control over 
their welfare and rights protections than adults. Should solutions to children’s rights 
issues involve the children of the nation, so as to stand up to adults and taking them to 
court? Should foster children gather together in a civil lawsuit and sue their abusive and 
neglectful parents and legal representatives? Should we give children more 
representation on top o f the many children’s advocates, guardian ad lietems, attorneys. 
Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) and litigators? Unfortunately class action 
lawsuits and additional child representatives will not address the current problems we are 
facing today within child welfare and their rights. Children are neither fully rational nor 
capable o f raising millions o f dollars for their interest groups or to contribute to 
legislator’s campaigns, and they certainly cannot vote legislators that support their 
policies into office. In addition, children are incapable o f protecting their interests
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because they lack proper understanding o f how the social contract functions in terms of 
state and federal rights, as well as in terms of legal duty or obligation. This leaves them 
subject to the powers o f parens patriae and to states that have adopted Juvenile Court 
Acts similar to the Illinois Juvenile Court Act o f 1899, which have no reference to nor 
avenue protecting any defined rights. Some states have not adopted a Juvenile Court Act 
as states vary in terms o f processing juveniles.
Therefore, children should have parallel due process rights with regard to human 
rights, moral rights and legal rights. Children are people who deserve to be treated with 
dignity, because processes o f state intervention can affect the psychological and 
emotional development o f a child. Children are not hot potatoes nor abandoned pets who 
need only shelter, they are developing people who deserve be recognized as future 
citizens. It is also important to recognize the social interest in maintaining parallel due 
process rights for children because it costs the public and the State resources to care for 
abused and neglected children while they are in the system and possibly when they leave 
the system, as statistics mentioned display that a good fraction o f abused and neglected 
children grow up to still rely on State resources as adults. Finally, it is important to 
ensure due process rights for children because they are potential citizens who are 
unaware o f their status as citizens due to the function o f our current system. Children are 
part o f the public sphere from the time o f birth and they cannot avoid contact with the 
political world, especially abused and neglected children who are within State Custody. 
Confrontation o f the political world does not begin once one becomes 18, it begins the 
moment one is bom, for example crossing the road, following mles o f society and the
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social contract, being required to go to school, and sitting in a child safety seat, to name a 
few.
In order for a problem to be addressed, the problem must be first recognized and it 
must have a history. Chapter Two will show how philosophies in child welfare and 
interest in the legal rights have been inconsistent and have conflicted, other than the trend 
toward increasing government intervention. In the quest to ensure the welfare o f children 
and protect children’s rights, the focus has veered on and off from genuine interest in the 
welfare o f children and their rights, to the obscurément of child welfare and rights issues 
via media exploitation, through hasty policy decision-making in response to the concerns 
o f the constituency. This chapter will consist o f three sections.
Section One o f Chapter Two will focus on the beginning o f interest in child 
welfare, from the founding o f this country to the 1899 Juvenile Court Act. This will 
include an historical investigation of the American political interest in children and an 
introduction to the basis for child welfare policy, parens patriae, which established the 
state’s interest and the right to intervene in the lives o f children. The Industrial 
Revolution and an increase in immigration in the 1800’s marked the beginning o f the 
Child Welfare movement, as it was discovered that the numbers o f children living in 
poverty were increasing dramatically. It will be shown that children were o f  little political 
interest until the late 1800’s, or during the Industrial Revolution, when the Juvenile Court 
Act of 1899 was established, placing children under the jurisdiction o f the Juvenile Court 
rather than the criminal courts. Until then, children had only been subjects o f their 
household. It will also be pointed out how shifting attitudes towards children affected 
children and the child welfare movement during this early era in child welfare.
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Section Two of Chapter Two will address how lack of focus and consistency 
within the child rights movement has impeded enactment o f effective legislation and 
recognition o f due process rights with regard to juveniles. After the Industrial 
Revolution, children were seen as burdens to the family rather than as contributing assets. 
Poverty in families as well as immigration increased, correlated to the increase in 
perceived juvenile crime and vagrancy o f  children.
Section Three of Chapter Two will address modem concems o f child welfare and 
children’s rights. This section will address how previous policy based on parens patriae 
has affected policy today. It will also introduce policies such as the Juvenile Court Act of 
1899, which addressed the dependency status o f children. Political issues that were raised 
during the 1900’s and affected child welfare policy will show how children’s welfare 
issues have been dealt with. Ideas o f modem political scientists such as Jeremy Roche 
and Joseph M. Hawes will be addressed as they have recognized the exploitation o f child 
welfare and rights issues by emphasizing the need for the protection o f children’s rights.
The culmination o f these sections within Chapter Two will demonstrate that 
citizens and politicians have both provided an unstable foundation for interests in the 
welfare and due process rights of children. Citizens have blindly put their faith in a 
system that provides the state unrestricted power in child welfare issues. This, along with 
media exploitation o f children’s issues and politicians using children’s issues as political 
platforms, has resulted in an embarrassing failure o f the child welfare system and 
disregard for children’s due process rights. Unstable public support o f children welfare 
policy has provided the state indiscriminate power over the rights o f children, canceling 
out due process protections that American citizens hold so dear.
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In Chapter Three I will discuss general policy issues that plague the juvenile 
justice system. The most current significant piece o f legislation is The Adoption Safe 
Families Act o f 1996 (ASFA), which was established to expedite child welfare cases; it 
utilizes financial incentives rather than establishing compliance by legal force. ASFA has 
once again been produced as a policy that claims to be in the best interest o f children, yet 
it functions only as a budget-balancing tool for child welfare workers and not as a policy 
ensuring that any legal rights o f children are defined nor protected. Unfortunately many 
due process issues o f many foster children are also impeded through bureaucratic flaws 
including: lack o f personnel, high turnover o f personnel, and legal officials not properly 
trained to work with juveniles and their families.^ Many children wait for years if  they 
ever get a home. In Chapter Three I will provide examples o f the downfalls o f the 
Adoption Safe Families Act relating it to reasoning addressed in Chapter Two. It will be 
shown that ASFA relies on monetary reward in order to get states to comply with policy 
provisions. Some may say that the ASFA greatly improves the protection o f children’s 
rights by imposing goals and deadlines to legal procedures, and it has, but there are still 
ever increasing numbers o f children that enter foster care^ and policies like ASFA are 
unable to address these children’s needs.
Chapter Four will compare the relationship adults have with the State versus the 
relationship children have with the State. This comparison will be primarily focused on 
the custodial relationship the state has with dependants by drawing on cases such as the 
Nancy Cruzan case. It will be demonstrated that positive law defining the due process
 ^Richard J. Gelles, The Book o f David: How Preserving Families Can Cost Children's Lives, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1997).
 ^National CASA Association “Why Children Are in Foster Care”, Excerpted from an October 1995 
newsletter o f the Child Welfare League o f  America, Foster Care F.Y.I.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rights of children can act as a reference point for child welfare policies. It will be shown 
the children have been and are still left with very few means to remedy wrongs against 
them in terms o f basic human rights violations and violations o f their dignity as persons 
and citizens o f a social contract and that positive law may be the remedy to policy issues. 
As shown in Chapter Two, policies have been enacted in reaction to rapidly rising rates 
o f children being taken from their homes due to abuse and neglect, but these policies 
have had little if  any result. If  the same result is repeated throughout generations of 
policy-making then the method or root o f that policy process must be examined. Chapter 
Four will also address the ethical issues that are involved with children’s rights. In this 
chapter the concepts o f rights, citizenship, and equality will be exposed and discussed. 
This chapter will address any conflicts o f interests that may arise between the due process 
rights and interests o f the family, the child, and society as they will be weighed against 
each other as the question is asked, why should the public care about the rights of 
children, foster children or their families? A correlation can be made between foster care 
and the future despair that involves a life o f poverty, drug abuse, or crime. The public 
must recognize that this connection exists. Children are not pets who need shelter, they 
are people who need love, trust and stability to form healthy relationships and have a 
solid start in life. Finally this chapter will address that significant child welfare policy 
suffers from the same problems other policies have had, resulting in infringements of 
children’s due process rights as citizens with a lack of legal regard to their welfare.
Chapter Five will provide my solution o f a Dependency Clause to the Illinois 
Juvenile Court Act o f 1899, which will address the status o f partial citizenship that 
children hold and their need for due process rights. It will be demonstrated that citizens
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who cannot engage in democratic processes still need a comparable level o f due process 
rights that addresses their incapability o f political practice. This solution can affect child 
welfare policies like the ASFA and promote children’s due process rights. The public 
must recognize that children, like dependent adults, require protections o f their best 
interests. In this chapter the concept o f junior citizenship will be introduced. What the 
state may perceive to be in the child’s interest may not be what the child or family 
perceives, and this can create a conflict between the child, the family, and the state. It is 
the state’s responsibility to ensure that the child and his or her family understand 
children’s status as future citizens and the position o f the state, which includes the basis 
o f interest it has in that family or child. If juvenile court settings are not going to be as 
formal as the proceedings for adults, then there needs to be a comparable means o f 
addressing the needs o f the child, the family, and the state that has the definitiveness and 
strength o f positive law.
Current methods and child rights representatives have not been able to remedy the 
amount o f mishandling policy practice, which has resulted in rights infringement that 
occur to foster children. Children cannot represent what their needs are, because unlike 
women, minority groups and the handicapped who have been able to represent their 
needs in terms of Constitutional rights protections, children are not adults. Politically, the 
latter groups have represented themselves through support of legislation and interest 
groups or through legislative testimony. But they were only recognized when the injured 
parties personally stood up for themselves and made political “noise”. Some children 
have had a positive experience growing up in foster care, but in actuality a majority does 
not. There are success stories, but they are rare and not the norm. Therefore an
10
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alternative solution that addresses the needs o f minor dependents must be investigated. 
Children’s due process rights need to be positively defined by law. The State must 
positively recognize that children are indeed partial citizens, and as partial citizens they 
deserve definition and protection o f parallel due process rights that are appropriate to 
their status as dependent partial citizens. This thesis will suggest that a Dependency 
Clause be utilized to assist in protection o f children’s due process rights.
11
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CHAPTER 2
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHILD 
WELFARE IN THE U.S.
Numerous socio-legal developments have impacted our modem child welfare 
system, requiring continuously increased government intervention. This chapter will 
provide an historical overview o f child welfare policy. It will reveal that without positive 
law defining due process rights o f abused and neglected children, children in turn, are left 
subject to insufficient policies'*, such as the Adoption Safe Families Act. It will be 
demonstrated that previous and current child welfare policies have not followed a 
consistent philosophy, which has effectively left holes in the system by providing the 
state with ineffective discretionary powers. Within the socio-legal status as dependents, 
children should still be afforded the opportunity as junior citizens to benefit from and 
exercise due process rights that protect them from overly intrusive state powers that do 
not inherently satisfy their best interests. It will be demonstrated in this historical 
synopsis that the absence o f concrete positive rights has impeded the development o f 
successful child welfare policies.
No solutions have been sufficiently effective to improve child welfare in the 
absence o f posited due process rights with regard to children, as many foster children 
linger in foster care for years. Children continue to have no traditionally-styled homes to 
go to, as many foster children live in overcrowded institutions. Many abused and
With regard to social intentions.
12
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
neglected children are also often placed with unqualified foster parents, while some 
remain to be abused by incompetent adults. Abused and neglected children must not be 
let down by a failing child welfare system. It is necessary to explore the impact o f child 
welfare policies by addressing how the public, the public officials, and government 
agencies have not supplied the juvenile welfare system with a sufficient focus or 
definition o f children’s due process with regard to abused and neglected children.
The next three sections address three important historical aspects that affect child 
welfare policy today. Section One will present parens patriae, which is the foundation 
for child welfare policy in the United States and the initiation o f the classification o f 
children as legal dependents. This section will define this doctrine and provide a legal 
perspective o f child welfare until the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act. Section Two will 
explore the social impacts o f the Progressive Era on child welfare policy. It will be 
demonstrated that a philosophy o f excessive idealism and moral absolutism dominated 
this era; reform movements focused on child labor law rather than on overall child 
welfare, thus degenerating the social impact o f child welfare reformers. Failing 
philosophies and a failing economy provided the opportunity for unchecked power to be 
left to legislators, whose interests were largely influenced by economic recovery and not 
rights definition o f children. Finally, Section Three will address the 1899 Illinois 
Juvenile Court Act by discussing its legal impacts and implications. Through this Act, 
the jurisdiction of courts over juvenile proceedings has been separated from jurisdiction 
over adults, yet the specific due process rights of children went undefined. This act set 
the citizenship-status o f children by denying them frill Constitutional protections. 
Consequently, the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act is effectively anti-legal in that it
13
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encourages minimal procedural formalities, which in turn, leaves children unprotected 
from procedural flaws. This legal separation has resulted in lax judicial proceedings and 
several due process violations o f abused and neglected children, demonstrating that 
children lack a defined status o f citizenship, which is essential to rights definition and 
protections.
This historical investigation reveals that the inconsistent philosophies of child 
welfare reformers and lack o f law, such as a Bill o f Rights specifically defining the rights 
o f children, have resulted in various ineffective juvenile welfare policies throughout 
American history. Children’s welfare policies were not created wholly in vain, but they 
have lacked appropriate follow-through. The two legal foundations for child welfare, 
parens patriae and the Illinois Juvenile Court Act o f 1899, do not provide enough 
democratic framework to act as a proper basis for policies governing how abused and 
neglected children should be processed throughout the child welfare system. A concrete 
definition o f children’s due process rights must be provided in order to ensure that the 
best interests o f abused and neglected children are in fact being protected. In the sections 
that follow, we explore these ideas deeper.
Section 1
This section indicates common law parens patriae as the basis for child welfare 
policy today. This section will also provide an historical legal analysis o f this power in 
the United States. It will be demonstrated through review o f court cases that although 
intended in benevolence, the courts have allowed juvenile welfare processing open to too
14
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much discretion without positive due process law, leading to a tendency o f malevolent 
effects on child welfare.
The root o f child welfare policy lies in parens patriae or government as parent, 
granting the state the power to act prior to recognition o f due process protections. This 
foundational philosophy, along with changing social roles o f children and the division o f 
juvenile and conventional law, as established in the Illinois Juvenile Court Act o f 1899, 
has defined children’s due process rights with vague statutes and vague provisions. This 
has left abused and neglected children without the capability o f redress, if  or when 
procedural error has been made, while under state guardianship. As we shall see, 
juvenile court history has demonstrated that “unbridled discretion, however benevolently 
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principled procedure.”^
The tradition o f state interest in the lives o f abused, neglected, and delinquent 
children is founded from common law parens patriae. “For a long time, one of the 
characteristic privileges o f sovereign power was the right to decide life and death. In a 
formal sense, it derived no doubt from the ancient patria potestas that granted the father 
o f the Roman family the right to ‘dispose’ o f the life o f his children and his slaves; just as 
he had given them life, so he could take it away.”  ^ By the time the right to life and 
death was framed by classical theoreticians, patria potestas was considerably diminished 
in form. Parens patriae as English common law maintains that the state, in interest o f its 
citizens, may act paternally as a kind and loving “parent” for its citizenry. Under the 
power of parens patriae, the state, in instances o f children who do not have competent 
guardians to care for them, may assume custodial possession. By the eighteenth century.
 ^Juvenile Justice in America. 6'*' Ed. (MacMillan Collection, 1996) 48.
® Michael Foucault, Trans. Robert Hurley. History o f Sexuality. V ol.l, an intro. (NewYork: Pantheon, 
1978).
15
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this English common law established the legal basis for state intervention in the 
relationship between children and their families here in the United States. It is important 
to note that parens patriae, a common law, acted and still acts as legal precedent, even 
though no express framework of legislation positively enacted this power o f intervention.
Insofar as parens patriae is a derivative o f patria potestas, the implementation of 
this forcible power has been used to control populations rather than function in the 
morally justified interest o f dependents. In the early 1800’s, recognition of abused and 
neglected o f children became more general. In 1825, Homer Folks, a minister, noted that 
public authorities have both the right and the duty to intervene in the cases o f parental 
cruelty or gross neglect of children, and “to remove the children by force if  necessary, 
and place them under surroundings more favorable for their development” .^
Although rooted in common law, numerous kinds o f policies and formal 
legislation make reference to parens patriae. Most child welfare policies and practices 
are supported by parens patriae under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. References to 
federal parens patriae legislation can be found in Title 15 o f the United States Code. 
Very few policies exist however, to limit this power because powers o f parens patriae 
precede many due process rights. In actuality, most child welfare policies and practices 
support parens patriae by practice o f the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, even though it is not 
a positive policy, leaving it and practices that follow from it incapable o f review by law.
Powers o f parens patriae and Constitutional issues in terms o f child welfare and 
the legal rights o f children have been brought into question before the court. Several 
court cases throughout the history of child welfare have scrutinized the powers o f parens
 ^Homer Folks, Care o f  Destitute. Neglected, and Delinquent Children. Reprint o f the 1902 Ed. (New 
York: Macmillan, 1998), 168-169.
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
patriae and due process protections through dissection and definition. The power of 
parens patriae was firmly established in 1838 as it was held in Ex Parte Crouse^ that the 
Bill of Rights did not apply to juveniles, re-affirming the powers o f parens patriae. This 
ruling afforded judicial review to all juvenile cases, without the guidance of any proper 
framework or positive law defining referable rights o f juveniles; it merely affirmed the 
power o f the state to intervene. Court rulings regarding juvenile delinquency based 
placements on acts of benevolence rather than punishments, therefore denying 
Constitutional due process claims that usually come with punitive procedure o f full- 
fledged citizens. It had also deemed that the parents had no standing because they did not 
have custody o f the child; the state retained custody due to negligence on behalf of the 
parent. The influence o f parens patriae was demonstrated once again in the 1905 
Commonwealth v. Fisher decision, when it was effectively ruled that parens patriae 
always trumped children’s due process protections in child welfare and, once again, that 
the Bill o f Rights did not apply to juveniles. Here it was assumed that anything the 
government does for a child in custody is always better than what a negligent parent 
could provide. It has been demonstrated that conflicts existed with regard to traditional 
due process rights for children in that there has been no standard set in cases o f loss of 
liberty. Defined due process rights have not been afforded to children who have been 
taken into custody under parens patriae powers, leaving the state with unbridled 
discretion over matters concerning children.
When a father challenged the Philadelphia House o f Refuge's right to hold his daughter who had been 
committed there by the mother. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that such placement was not 
punishment but benevolence, therefore no due process claim could be made by the father, and that the 
father had no standing anyway because the state had a legal obligation to step in whenever the parents are 
irresponsible. (1838)
17
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Due process protections- fundamental, procedural, and systematic practices-act as 
legal safeguards, protecting the rights o f anyone who comes in contact with legal 
authorities. Under parens patriae, however, these many due process rights are rendered 
fruitless for children. In the end, children within state custody are not provided full 
constitutional protections, which could be utilized to protect a citizen’s basic human 
rights. Children should at the very least be afforded a set o f standards when confronted 
with state intervention and processes. We seem to be able to save children from abusive 
homes but are unable to avoid abuses from the system.
In the 1960’s, the first full legal examination o f the child welfare system occurred 
in Kent v U.S and in In re Gault. In Kent, the tone o f child welfare changed as the 
Supreme Court recognized juveniles’ Constitutional rights as issues o f due process. The 
Kent case focused on the concept o f parens patriae. Kent provided the right for attorneys 
representing juveniles to have access to juvenile records, for the necessity o f denoting 
reasons for transfer in delinquency cases. Fourteenth Amendment rights of children had 
not been considered until they were finally introduced to child welfare through In re 
Gault, which provided some due process procedure by affording the right to an attorney 
to juveniles.^ The landmark case added formality to juvenile court proceedings by 
providing Miranda rights, adequate notice o f charges, the right to confront and cross- 
examine accusers, assistance o f counsel, and the rights of sworn testimony and appeal, 
once again establishing that the state afforded some Constitutional protections to 
children. The Court held that the proceedings for juveniles had to comply with the 
requirements o f the Fourteenth Amendment, affording some legal recognition to children
® Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers. (The Invention o f Delinquency) Second Edition, (Chicago: The 
University o f Chicago Press), 161-2.
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as protected citizens. The Court also found that the procedures used in Gault's case met 
none of these requirements. Most Supreme Court decisions that followed Gault did 
clarify the rights o f juveniles. Nonetheless, then and today there have been no formal 
guidelines, boundaries, or concrete definitions that state what legal rights children have 
with regard to child welfare other than with processes with regard to courts procedure.
Although the application o f parens patriae came into question in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, legal attempts to remedy the often-deplorable situations o f perceived'*^ juvenile 
delinquency and neglected children have failed. If children are subject to the power of 
parens patriae, then a guideline that restricts or delineates the state’s duties to children 
while in state custody must be established in order to utilize this power in a fashion that 
enhances its function and prevents its abuse. It should be noted that juveniles, as junior 
citizens, need comparable protection from arbitrary paternal procedures and ad hoc 
policies.
Attempts have been made both in the past and in the present to improve the lives 
o f children in unfortunate circumstances. Parens patriae and notions o f paternalism by 
the State have helped abused, neglected and abandoned children, but how effective have 
they been? Parens patriae has defined children as dependants, but has not provided a 
standard for processing dependents. Unfortunately, the interest that the state has shown 
in the lives o f American children through the legacy of parens patriae has not ensured 
nor secured the best interests o f said dependents, rather this power has superceded 
important Constitutional protections that Americans hold so dear. Without Constitutional 
protections, dependent citizens such as foster children are left without avenues o f review 
and recourse, and are incapable o f reforming the child welfare system in a way so as to
' Many children deemed delinquent have actually been found to be abused or neglected.
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legally protect their fundamental human rights. Although the Constitution is the 
“supreme law of the land”, parens patriae remains a powerful building block for child 
welfare theory that seems to supercede our “supreme law” which was created to 
guarantee procedural rights. The issue then becomes whether rights o f children or any 
dependent citizens come prior or post social contract. The next section will address how 
social attitudes toward abused and neglected children affected the way in which child 
welfare policies were created.
Section 2
The interplay between the applications o f parens patriae and shifting social 
attitudes during the Progressive Era o f American history is revealing. This section will 
explore the effect o f conflicting ideals that existed during this era as reformers focused 
more on the social interests o f capitalism and the elimination o f social evils, which were 
not in the best interests o f children and their welfare. It will be shown that during this 
time excessive idealism and moral absolutism affected the focus o f reform movements by 
acting more as an obstacle than in assisting with the formation o f child welfare policy.
Although to a lesser degree than the days o f patria potestas, at the beginning o f 
our country’s history child welfare was primarily a matter for the home and the patriarch. 
The state seldom initiated interventions into the lives o f families and children until the 
early eighteen hundreds and near the beginning o f the Industrial Revolution. Child abuse 
and neglect had not yet been rigidly defined nor recognized as public issues, and 
resources to support child welfare issues were largely unavailable. The father, as the head 
of the household and its maintenance, held the power to discipline family members, but
20
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each member o f the household still had subordinate duties and responsibilities. 
Throughout the 1700’s and 1800’s, a large part o f the populace worked in agriculture. 
Children at this time retained levels o f significant responsibility towards the family and 
the community that do not exist today since they provided a good deal o f labor. Hawes 
states, “Children were very much a part of this world and became productive members of 
it as soon as they were capable (typically around the age o f 7).””  Legally and socially 
children were seen and treated as little adults by their families and by their communities.
Instead o f recognizing children as important contributing members to their 
families and community, their social status was diminished from contributor to full-on 
dependent. Even though politically they were powerless, children were previously 
recognized as persons capable o f providing income or other meaningful contribution, but 
economic and social changes induced by the Industrial Revolution affected children by 
changing the status o f children in society. This change in status resulted in a romanticized 
view o f children thus initiating strict protection o f said status.
It had not been until 1870 that the U.S. government had taken official notice o f 
children’s employment outside o f the home, when it was noted by Census figures that 
one-eighth o f children between the ages o f ten and fifteen were employed.'^ Most middle 
class families, who could afford to keep their children in school and out o f work, were 
alarmed when census figures and media accounts exposed the terrible conditions under 
which some children worked. Socialites'^ alarmed by census statistics responded by 
lobbying for restrictions on child labor as a matter o f child welfare. By 1900, the number
" Joseph M. Hawes, The Children’s Rights Movement (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1991) 2.
Alfred de Grazia, Industrial and Urban Frontiers . First ed. in CD-Rom. (New Jersev: Metron. 19991 27. 
Philanthropic members o f  high society that mingled closely with businessmen and legislators, often 
providing financial support though social functions such as fundraisers and charity balls.
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of working children had risen from one-eighth to one-sixth. Instead o f calling to action a 
defined standard of the treatment o f children as a whole, the public digressed by focusing 
on only one aspect'"* o f many child abuses. High public interest in child labor, although 
necessary at the time, diverted energies away from establishing child welfare policies that 
could have protected children not only from abuse o f child laborers, but possibly abuses 
from families and other institutions.
Political interest in juvenile issues was nominal until problems of vagrancy and 
delinquency among children were addressed during the Progressive Era. Due to child 
labor restrictions in the late eighteenth century, many children had to find alternative 
means o f earning income, leading many to work on the streets as vendors or entertainers, 
and thus resulting in yet more interest in the vagrancy and truancy o f juveniles. Changing 
social roles o f children contributed to the perception that delinquency and vagrancy were 
on the rise. Frederick Wines had suggested the societal impact o f the Industrial 
Revolution when he stated, “I think that the invention o f machinery has changed not only 
the appearance o f the world, but also the relations o f man to man.” '^ He went on to state, 
“Our recent sudden and rapid development in the several directions [labor saving 
machinery, growth o f cities and the emancipation o f women] may account in some 
degree for the present measure and manifestations o f pauperism, insanity, and crime.” '^ 
The focus o f reformers was on children who were continually found in the streets, child 
labor issues, children who were deemed delinquent, and those children who were
Joseph M. Hawes, The Children’s Rights Movement (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1991).
' Frederick H. Wines, “Report Committee on Causes o f  Pauperism and Crime,’’PNCCC, 1886 pp 207-14.
Ibid.
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incarcerated with adults'^. Many children perceived to be homeless or delinquent came 
from impoverished families.
Initiation of the children’s rights movement in the early 1800’s was primarily a 
philanthropic cause o f wealthy socialites. Even though reformers showed high interest in 
the lives o f needy children, very few subsidies had been set aside to aid them. Societies 
o f wealthy businessmen and others influenced by the reform philosophies o f both the 
Progressive Era and the Age o f Enlightenment became known as Child Savers.'* Child 
Savers founded reformation homes for homeless and delinquent children, which were 
established to “correct and reform” homeless juveniles. However, such institutions were 
later found to be abusive, overcrowded, and ineffective in decreasing the rates of 
orphaned and delinquent children'^. Funding for such institutions was scarce, aside from 
institutions for children of veterans; the first tax-supported efforts in the field o f child­
care were subsidies granted around 1899 by the state to individual institutions in the form 
o f one-time lump sums,^" which also happens to be at the same time the Illinois Juvenile 
Court Act o f  1899 was enacted. State funds were directed toward business and farm 
subsidies, and not public welfare; this left children subject to policies o f orphanages and 
almshouses for assistance. Nevertheless, even though reformers showed high interest in 
the lives o f  needy children, very few subsidies had been set aside to aid them.
Public interest in the welfare o f children about this time appeared to stem from a 
larger interest in the protection of society from the future o f unacceptable classes of 
citizens, that is, the poor. Moreover, competition for employment and wages sparked
Joseph M. Hawes, The Children’s Rights Movement (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1991).
Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers. (The Invention o f Delinquency) Second Edition, (Chicago: The 
University o f  Chicago Press),
Joseph M. Hawes, The Children’s Rights Movement (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1991).
Ibid.
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public interest in child welfare as an increase in child labor in factories resulted in 
weakened and breakdown of family control, the separation o f work from education, and a 
gradual change from a rural environment to the urban setting. In this way, many children 
o f poor families were intensely affected by the anti-child labor movement. Rather than 
ensuring the protection o f children as victims o f crimes committed against them, focus 
remained on children o f lower income families under the guise if  ridding society o f social 
evils o f vagrancy and delinquency.
Most historians have shared the view that the nineteenth-century reformers were 
fundamentally benevolent, but some historians have failed to recognize that they were 
imposing impossible ideals o f fulfilling the American D r e a m . M a n y  of the children 
considered delinquent were not delinquents at all, but in fact were children attempting to 
supplement their family incomes. At times these children were found either habitually 
working on the streets, or were actually orphaned, runaways, or abandoned. Child 
savers felt that it was their duty to save children from the evils o f urban settings and work 
environments in order to ensure the future with viable, productive American citizens. 
Unfortunately some reformers’ opinions o f inner-city children were not favorable as 
children from impoverished inner-city environments were considered “intellectual dwarfs 
and physical moral and wrecks (sic) whose characters were predominantly shaped by 
their physical surroundings.”^^  Immigrants were also considered unsocialized. 
Compounded with the impersonality, isolation, and degradation o f cities, social
The American dream, referring to citizens finding ample employment to successfully sustain themselves 
and their families with the opportunity to fulfill their interests. Susan Whitelaw Downs, Child Welfare and 
Familv Services: Policies and Practice. 6* Ed. (New York: Pearson Education, 1999).
^  Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers. (The Invention o f Delinquencv) Second Edition. (Chicago: The 
University o f Chicago Press), 40.
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relationships between citizens were a far cry from the way they stood during Colonial 
times.
Many children, whether orphaned or not, did end up in detention or reformatory 
homes founded by child saving philanthropists, but some child’s rights advocates found 
these conditions unacceptable. Minister Charles Coring Brace founded the Children’s 
Aid Society in response to the deplorable status o f child welfare. He started the first 
orphan trains, rescuing orphaned and impoverished children from so-called reformation 
homes. Brace took trainloads o f orphaned children at reduced fares, mostly poor children, 
immigrants or those considered delinquent, across the country to auction the children off 
in various towns.^^ His reform philosophy included emphasis on an education in 
preparation o f an industrial discipline in the greater interest o f public order and public 
safety. In many instances, these children were not orphaned per se, but again just like 
many considered to be delinquent, were habitually found on the streets. Many o f these 
children and their parents retained hope o f reunification once their parents’ lives were 
more stable, but this was not often the case. There was no turning-back once the children 
left their home. At each town, the children were washed, brought to the town square, and 
a brief description was given o f each child to farmers, merchants, townspeople, or anyone 
who would bid on the children and provide a home for them. Some children did find 
homes,^"* some became children o f loving families, and some worked as hands or 
assistants to guardians. Many, however, remained in bleak situations.
It may be that crusaders, in their call for rights for children, had been over-zealous 
and incapable o f comprehending differing social practices considered to be normal in the
Ibid.
Between 1853 and 1929, 31,081 children were placed in homes for orphan trains.
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lives o f the impoverished. Wealthy child savers continued to establish organizations in 
response to the increasing numbers o f abused and neglected children living in the streets 
or imprisoned. By 1875, the New York Society for the Prevention o f Cruelty to Children 
(SPCC) was established and, by 1898, more than 2000 Societies existed. These 
organizations assisted in the investigation of alleged cruelty and neglect, in the 
presentation of the facts to the courts, and in assistance to police and public prosecutors 
in bringing justice to adults who were responsible for crimes against children. Some 
views of the early SPCC’s are positive, claiming that SPCC’s were helpful in the quest 
for protection of child welfare and children’s rights, while, “According to other students 
o f the SPCC movement, the society’s development was widely perceived as an attack on 
the family economy of the poor.”^^  The intentions o f the SPCC’s may have been 
displaced, as they possessed stigmatizing and tainted views o f orphaned children as 
members o f a lower social class who were in need of reformation and rehabilitation. This 
psychological mechanism is not uncommon in our history comparable to the reasoning 
that was used to justify racism or sexism. The impoverished were thought to have 
“brought their misery upon themselves through idleness, laziness, or character defect.”^^  
What some may have perceived as a crude way of living, was a normal way of life to 
others, such as allowing children to work on the streets as paperboys or match girls. 
Solutions offered by the child welfare activists did not directly reflect the best interests o f 
children, rather to address child welfare activists undertook to push their own views by 
enacting education acts.^^ Children should be required to attain a certain level of
Joseph M. Hawes, The Children’s Rights Movement (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1991)23
Ibid. 40
Ibid.
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
education, but this solution is ineffective in protecting the welfare o f abuse and neglected 
children.
It seems that influential members o f the upper class may have tried to set 
standards for society that really were unattainable for lower-class members at this time. 
Clement points out that before 1850, only the most well-to-do could afford to keep their 
children from performing labor in the field, home or factories. Clement also goes on to 
point out that children’s labor ensured some families’ survival and even contributed to 
the purchase o f the family home, which provided a level o f security against poverty and 
homelessness^*. He also notes, “The sharp division that developed between parents who 
could afford to keep their children out of the labor market, and parents so poor that child 
labor was essential to family survival culminated in the anti-child labor movement o f the 
nineteenth c e n t u r y . W h a t  reformers didn’t recognize was that it was easier for 
children o f upper class families to get their education, than it was for children who had to 
get state required education and assist in supporting their families. Reformers never 
made the connection that ensuring education was not the solution for protecting children 
from abuses and neglect by adults and their systems.
In addition, adults sought to further protect the rights o f children by placing 
restrictions on child labor. The prohibition o f child labor established the moral right for a 
child to be a child. In 1904, the National Children Labor Committee viewed childhood as 
sacred. Child labor had been common until it was nearly banished by the New Deal 
during the Great Depression. The idea that children are fragile and needy, not a viable 
source o f assistance to the family and familial income, reveals that Americans came to
Joseph M. Hawes, The Children’s Rights Movement (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1991) 
” Ibid. 123.
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believe that the labor supply derived from removing children from intact families was a 
social ill. Again, enacting child labor restrictions did protect children from abuses by 
employers, but it lacked, just as Education Acts, the influence to protect children from 
abuses by society and the state as a whole. These Acts protected aspects o f child rights 
but they did not address or define what the basis o f children’s rights were.
During the Industrial Revolution there was a profound increase in poor and 
homeless children,^** one that lasted through the years o f the Great Depression, this 
affected attitudes towards child welfare. Protections o f children’s fundamental rights 
were not the main interest during this Era; economics and politics were. During the 
Industrial Revolution, capitalism had a major influence on policy formation as well. Key 
political actors wanted to maintain and secure political interests and economic 
arrangements by lobbying for policies that favored business over social interests and the 
needs o f poor families and their children.^'.
Supporters o f child welfare rights influenced political platforms and political 
decision-making. The upper class was concerned more about the “best interests” o f their 
own children rather than the children o f the poor or children in general. During the 
presidential campaign o f 1912, Roosevelt favored national child labor legislation, while 
Wilson opposed it. Later, in the election o f I9I6 , Wilson changed his platform and gave 
his support at the last minute, possibly in reaction to influences o f campaign financers 
and supporters^^. Child labor had been used as a political bargaining tool as Edward 
Keating notes that the Republicans had claimed that Democrats would sacrifice child 
labor to the interests o f the southern mill owners. The Keating-Owen bill o f 1916
Joseph M. Hawes, The Children’s Rights Movement (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1991) 
Ibid.
Biography o f Woodrow Wilson, http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/ww28.html
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regulated child labor, but it was later found to be unconstitutional as child labor was 
interpreted to not be a matter o f interstate commerce. Keating demonstrated through his 
comments and policy-making practice that child labor was indeed a bargaining tool and 
not necessarily an issue o f deep concern for politicians. Using child labor as a political 
bargaining tool had a great effect on how the public and the legislators dealt with 
protection o f children’s rights. This inconsistency suggests that politicians may have been 
reacting to the interests o f lofty constituents and economic concerns rather than in 
concern for the best interests o f  children.
In response to the troubles o f the Great Depression, the National Recovery 
Administration sought to regulate child labor in 1933 through the use of codes regulating 
labor relations. In 1935, the passage o f the Federal Social Security Act finally made 
Federal funds available to states for children’s services. During the New Deal, the 
prohibition o f  child labor became a standard feature in virtually all individual state labor 
laws adopted. The Fair Labor Standards Act o f 1938 encapsulated the notion that the 
government firmly believed that child labor was a social evil.
The attempt to eliminate rather than examine what was considered to be an evil of 
society reflects that reformers’ philosophies had a tendency to overlook fundamental 
issues o f child welfare rather than attempting to remedy foundational aspects of 
children’s welfare issues. Focuses o f reformers diverted from protecting children from 
abuses o f society to specifically protecting children from abuses by employers. Due to 
social changes during the Industrial Revolution the current romanticized social 
construction o f the dependant child formed, and the view that a child was not to be 
recognized as a rights bearing citizen o f the community continues and affects policies
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that attempt to protect unposited due process rights o f abused and neglected children. 
While the abolition o f child labor and inception o f Education Acts could be viewed as a 
means o f driving out societal evils o f pauperism by producing a class o f educated, 
working citizens, this proved to divert the interest o f reformers. High public interest in 
child labor and education, although necessary at the time, diverted energies away from 
establishing child welfare policies that could have protected children not only from abuse 
o f child laborers, but possibly abuses from families and other social institutions.
In turn, the bottom line of child welfare issues for politicians was balancing 
budgets in the economy through political trade-offs. Politicians used child labor and 
education as political bargaining tools by enacting policies that provided monetary 
incentives to comply with favored policies, which is still quite prevalent today. These 
issues will further be discussed in the next chapter, as we examine current policies such 
as the Adoption Safe Families Act, where these attitudes just mentioned will be found.
Section 3
Current legal perspectives towards children have been the result o f both parens 
patriae and socially progressive attitudes that existed throughout the eighteen- and early 
nineteen hundreds. It was not until the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act that the 
jurisdiction o f adult courts and child welfare were separated into distinct spheres in an 
overall attempt to rationalize child welfare reforms into a succinct system o f child 
welfare and juvenile justice. Court decisions reflected what was perceived to be in the 
best interests o f children and their welfare. Benevolent-minded, but ineffective and 
piecemeal, laws were established in reaction to abuse and neglect and child labor, but
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were not proactive in defining what children’s rights are. Influenced by the Progressive 
Era, various legal institutions concerning juveniles were created as practical means of 
social control readjusting themselves to conform to the influences o f the emerging 
capitalist system.
Since the Illinois Juvenile Court Act o f 1899 formally separated the jurisdiction of 
children from adults, it has subsequently been determined that children are not fully 
protected by the Constitution, thus permitting and encouraging informal legal practices 
within the juvenile court system. The Juvenile Court Act movement went beyond a 
humanitarian concern for the special treatment o f juveniles. Once the Illinois Juvenile 
Court Act was adopted various states followed by adopting Juvenile Court Acts as well. 
It was not by accident that the jurisdiction o f issues selected by child savers were 
primarily directed towards children o f lower class and immigrant families. Support for 
the Illinois Juvenile Court Act was mostly led by class-conscious sectors o f “monopoly 
capital [sic] who recognized the necessity for far reaching economic, political and social 
reforms.”^^  Not all reformers, however, supported the informality o f the juvenile court 
system. A juvenile court judge. Judge Mack, had advised juvenile court judges to 
dispense justice with the same “ordinary trappings” of the courtroom. He also stressed 
that a child should be made aware o f his confrontation with the power o f the state. This 
did not occur then, and it insufficiently occurs today. The informality o f juvenile court 
proceedings would later prove to hinder and not to enhance the rights o f children as the 
juvenile court system sought to personalize the administration o f justice by removing 
many aspects o f due process.
Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers. (The Invention o f Delinquency) Second Edition, (Chicago: The 
University o f Chicago Press).xviii 
Ibid
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Without the same procedures, protections of due process that are essential in 
today’s concept o f justice, due process rights are overlooked. “Although the youth’s 
treatment was in fact given separate attention by the courts, the informality o f the 
proceedings under parens patriae also deprived juveniles o f the same legal rights 
provided to adults.”^^  Even though separate attention by courts was given to juveniles, 
this did not ensure the same legal procedures and protections. The Illinois Juvenile Court 
Act incorporated informal social aspects o f the family life within the process of 
adjudication. By removing all cases involving juveniles from the jurisdiction of criminal 
courts it affected how children were processed through the judicial system; various 
shortcuts and legal informalities would be practiced that impinge on the protection of 
children’s legal and civil rights^^.
Instead of receiving special attention by the courts, the separation that the 1899 
Illinois Juvenile Court Act instituted led to a system that is more lax in its procedures, 
thus leaving children, as partial citizens, protected from abusive families but not abuses 
by state procedure, which would normally be protected by due process rights. Some 
courts were in fact made to resemble dens or living rooms, and judges were expected to 
act affectionately with children while still providing a sense o f adjudication.^’
The protection o f the best interests o f children needs to have the self-same and 
self-evident protections that any other group or citizen has had in relation to state custody 
and legal procedure, regardless o f citizenship status. The decision o f the Warren Court
Juvenile Justice in America. 6* Ed. (MacMillan Collection, 1996)
Criminal courts deal with adults who are charged with committing state and federal crimes. Victims can 
only bring offenders to civil court where they can sue for damages.
Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers. (The Invention o f Delinquency) Second Edition, (Chicago; The 
University o f Chicago Press).
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resulted in litigation over procedure/* It has been shown that the nature o f the judicial 
hearings and purposes o f the judgments are rarely explained to the children, who only 
sometimes realize the seriousness of their circumstance and have no way of knowing 
whether the testimony offered against them was in fact legal. Then, and even now, the 
transcripts o f court proceedings do not exist and are found to be incomplete, which makes 
appeal to higher courts difficult. Due process rights are legally positive rights that should 
protect rights o f all citizens o f the United States.
Children who are abused or neglected have little means o f taking adults or 
guardians to court to review or remedy damages inflicted by their guardians or the state, 
nor have they had the right to appeal decisions about state placements. During the Warren 
Court era the Supreme Court delineated the parameters o f due process by insisting that 
the rules did not apply to juvenile proceedings since they were not adversarial in nature.^^ 
Children were offered assistance and guidance, but judicial records were not available to 
the press or public, hearings were conducted in relative privacy, proceedings were 
informal, and most importantly, due process safeguards were not applicable under the 
court’s jurisdiction. By intervening in the life o f a child, the state is expressing that the 
quality o f a child’s welfare is not acceptable, therefore it implies that children have the 
right to some standard o f welfare. When the state uses its power to intervene in the life of 
a person, especially a child, it must ensure due process protections o f that person’s best 
interests, and not only protect the welfare o f this person. The definitions of welfare and 
interests are very different; it is the responsibility o f the state to ensure that they are not 
defined as one and the same.
Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court. (Washington: Washington and Lee Law School, 2002). 
Theodore J. Stein, The Child and the Law. (New York: Child Welfare League of America, Inc.,1998) 
83.
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Conflict exists between the idealized goals o f reformers and operating realities. 
State powers in parens patriae and the Illinois Juvenile Court Act have set vague 
guidelines on the welfare o f children under the care o f their guardians, but no legal 
parameters defining due process rights have been established with regard to child welfare 
policy. Throughout American history, the state has used the legal legacy of parens 
patriae to give the Juvenile Court the power to intervene in the lives o f children who 
have been abused and neglected as the basis for child welfare policy. The partial 
introduction o f due process through In re Gault into the juvenile court had little effect on 
the effective administration o f justice in the juvenile court. Child welfare advocates 
agree; in 1966 Justice Abe Portas commented on the effects o f the 1899 Illinois Juvenile 
Court Act as a reaction to a strong punishment given to a child. He indicated that 
children were receiving the worst o f both worlds, neither receiving adult nor child 
protections. “What had been designed as a benevolent system to handle child abuse, 
neglect and delinquency so as to protect children from the trauma of the adult’s legal 
system was found to be constitutionally deficient.”"*® Judicial figures had reeognized that 
a romanticized stigma had been attached to the child. In this way, the Act did little to 
change the quality o f the institutional life o f children even though it acted as the very 
vehicle under which children were institutionalized. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act has 
assisted in the requirement that children should be raised in a suitable environment, even 
though appropriate funding was not provided through legislation or other resources to
Juvenile Justice in America. 6 Ed. (MacMillan Collection, 1996) 48.
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provide alternative suitable environments. This appears contrary to the Act’s special 
provisions."*'
Since the earliest recognition o f child welfare and their human rights, there have 
been many procedural problems standing in the way o f children’s rights. It is recognized 
that children are incapable of effectively expressing themselves politically, as well as 
protecting themselves legally due to their age and inexperience; this fact has contributed 
to the enactment o f laws protecting children, but it is not the source o f law. Legal justice 
can only function with a defined conception o f rights, and according to our Constitution, 
rights stem from citizenship status and status as a person. As juveniles, children are not 
seen as full-fledged citizens, thus affecting due process rights definition and protection. 
In the past, when confronted with despotic state-power, populations thought to be 
inferior, such as women, African-Americans, and the handicapped, were capable of 
utilizing democratic means to assert political change because they are adults. Foster 
children, as dependent citizens, are unable to utilize these courses o f  action effectively 
because they are either incapable o f understanding or incapable of action. Not only is it 
important that all citizens, young and old, have the means to protect themselves from 
overly obtrusive government practices, it should also be ensured that the state will 
effectively act in everyone’s best interest.
Influences o f political decision makers have largely been in response to economic, 
legal, and social trends, rather than in the best interest o f children. It has been 
demonstrated throughout this chapter that this key issue has affected the status of 
citizenship o f children, which increased the chances for procedural defects that exist
Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers. (The Invention o f Delinquency) Second Edition, (Chicago: The 
University o f Chicago Press). 146.
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today in child welfare policies. It has been demonstrated that there was insufficient focus 
by decision makers into the nature o f the socio-legal rights o f children. The focus 
primarily remained on humanitarian philosophies which are based on moral law and not 
positive law; providing aid and assistance versus empowerment by the establishment o f 
legal rights and their protections. It has also been revealed that Supreme Court decisions 
have had little success in affecting procedural flaws that many foster children face while 
under state supervision. Many policies such as the Adoption Safe Families Act (ASFA), 
address timelines and requirements for funding o f care, rather than addressing what 
procedural rights abused and neglected children do have. Although policies such as the 
ASFA attempt to expedite placement processes o f abused and neglected children, they 
still fail to follow a concrete legal standard as to how the state should protect total 
processing o f abused and neglected children. The third chapter will provide the most 
current examples o f policy affecting children today and demonstrate how the policies, 
like the ASFA, have provided little solution to the growing number o f foster children 
who continue to suffer.
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CHAPTER 3
CURRENT LEGISLATIVE TRENDS 
IN CHILD WELFARE 
It has been demonstrated that child welfare policy has existed without any formal 
guidelines, boundaries, or concrete definitions establishing any legally positive rights for 
abused and neglected children. Throughout the history of child welfare the attempt to 
eliminate rather than examine what was perceived to be social evils reflects the tendency 
o f policy makers to overlook the best interests o f children. What is lacking are defined 
due process protections that go beyond boundary o f simple court procedure. Policies that 
have provided the foundation for juvenile welfare policy, such as parens patriae and the 
Juvenile Court Act, all too often have provided the courts with too much discretion and 
not enough guidance into what is, legally, in the best interest o f children. Little room has 
been left for review o f judgments or for recourse o f procedural errors while in state care. 
This chapter will examine current significant policies, such the Adoption Safe Families 
Act, and demonstrate that the lack o f an established positive guideline has been a repeated 
historical flaw, which essentially exists today as well.
It will be asserted that the sheer number o f children in the child welfare system 
alone attests to the fact that the system is not working."*’ The inconsistent philosophies of 
policy makers have revealed that both legislation and the means o f care have been unable
Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy: Race. Poverty, and the Underclass. (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1993).
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to adapt to issues in child welfare resulting in an increase o f various problems. 
Assurance o f children’s welfare is certainly in some degree the responsibility o f the adult 
population, since the power to ensure their own protection and welfare lies beyond the 
purview of children’s own means. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, neither the 
assurance of child welfare, nor the assurance of children’s rights have been explicitly 
guaranteed by social contract, such as provided to adults via the Constitution. This 
chapter will also demonstrate that recent philosophies of policies created conflict with 
each other in terms child welfare and their best interest. Finally this chapter will examine 
The Adoption Safe Families Act as the most recent significant piece o f child welfare 
legislation. This piece o f legislation encourages agencies to comply with guidelines by 
offering financial rewards for timely placement of foster children rather than acting as a 
policy that withholds funding for noncompliance. As with previous legislation, this 
policy is not enough to ensure that children’s best interests are actually met, agencies 
only need to comply with such policies to receive aid through funding, not uphold any 
delineated rights of children. It will be revealed that a proper definition o f children’s due 
process rights is still lacking, and child welfare policies continue, as they have in the past, 
to fail to meet the needs o f children who deserve to have their interests met; political 
incentives to protect ambiguous definitions o f rights such as ‘best interests’ or 
‘reasonable efforts’ are in fact insufficient, redundant, and useless in terms of upholding 
any child rights.
Until 1964, child welfare services by the state had developed slowly; the majority 
o f dependent and neglected children were served mainly by volunteer agencies, 
demonstrating that child welfare had not become o f full legal interest even though
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advocates had been protecting children’s ‘rights’ since the 1800’s. Until this time, many 
courts operated placement programs, mostly for children of veterans.
Maintenance o f consistent interest in issues o f child welfare remains in question, 
as children’s rights have taken second seat to interests of reformers during the 19*’’ and 
20®' century social movements. In the period o f the 1950’s and 1960’s, activism on behalf 
o f children was complicated and in part overshadowed by the Women’s Liberation 
Movement. Women wanted to fully be themselves, having the freedom of equal 
employment, the choice to have or not to have children, or to marry or to not marry. At 
the same time, children’s rights advocates insisted on children having the right to full­
time mothers. In this way, philosophies o f feminists and child rights advocates clashed as 
one side demanded adherence to socially constructed responsibilities, and the other 
demanded that any responsibilities undertaken are a matter o f choice and should not be 
state mandated. These changing lifestyles and philosophies imitated the shifting focus 
that existed during the child labor movement. Improving children’s human rights and 
welfare in child welfare policy was still primarily focused on the removal o f children 
from abusive homes and placement elsewhere, rather than based on their needs and legal 
rights while in custody.
A defined standard within our system must be set in terms o f processing juveniles 
as philosophies and statistics continue to change. During the I970’s the National Center 
on Child Abuse and Neglect had supplanted the U. S. Children’s Bureau because of 
increasing levels o f children found within the juvenile court system in gathering 
information and data about the relative incidence o f child abuse in the United States."*’ It 
was found that the majority o f children under state custody have been placed there due to
Joseph M. Hawes, The Children’s Rights Movement. (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1991)
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forms of neglect rather than the actual presence or threat o f physical harm or danger. O f 
the groups that they studied, sixty-four percent had suffered from some form of 
deprivation, twenty-five percent had suffered from physical injury, seventeen percent 
from emotional maltreatment, six percent suffered from sexual abuse, and nine percent 
suffered from other circumstances."*"* This report reveals that most reported cases involve 
neglect rather than actual physical abuse. In terms o f legal status, a standard has not even 
been set regarding a clear policy toward protecting the welfare o f children in terms of 
first level or core human rights, such as immediate safety and survival. What then are the 
standards and guidelines a state must follow in order to protect children, and from what? 
Roberta Gottesman tells us that the primary goals o f modem child legislation are three­
fold: a reporting system to assist in the discovery o f child abuse, protective services for 
the child, and rehabilitative services for the family.'*’ These three requirements provide a 
good reference for assessing whether the children’s welfare is at issue or whether policy 
makers are continuing to enact ineffective policies.
There must be a system o f defined rights to ensure that children’s best interests 
are protected throughout every process while under state supervision, from removal from 
the home, to court processes, and placement procedures. The emotional effects o f taking 
a child from his or her home and placing him or her in an institutional setting or an 
unfamiliar family can be irreversible in terms o f psychological development; these 
involve emotional attachment and its relation to intellectual and moral development."*® 
Children have the right to stay with their families if  possible, and if the state does not
Ibid.
Roberta Gottesman Child and the Law. (New York: West, 1981).
MCDS Families - Supporting Families -  FAQs 
http://www.mcds.gov.sg/web/faml suplaml_faq.asp?szMod=faml&szSubMod=faq
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have a better alternative. Even so, many children have been saved from horrendous 
living conditions, such as literally eating and living in trash, living with animal and 
human feces found in their living quarters, malnutrition and not receiving proper medical 
treatment. Still, these conditions are potentially repairable and reversible, and the effects 
o f these conditions may be addressed with proper adjudication and counseling. Children 
must also be protected from mistreatment from the state in terms of errors in processing 
paperwork and follow up on institutional procedures. These examples reaffirm the 
aforementioned studies that show that abuse is not positive; rather, it is a negative form of 
abuse-as-neglect.
Our social contract utilizes legal means to protect our due process rights as 
citizens, thus defending many self-evident human rights with legal rights. Adults, as full- 
fledged citizens have the Constitution, the judicial system and their appointed legislators 
(a three-tiered system) to rely on for remedy of conflicts of interests. In recent years, few 
federal and state agencies have funded programs to improve the legal representation of 
juveniles, thus adding to the hindrance o f the protection of children’s best interests and 
due process rights. Furthermore, federally funded training efforts have focused on 
disposition and placement issues rather than on funding efforts to safeguard the legal 
rights o f juveniles. The emphasis, in short, has been on where to house youngsters, rather 
than how to help them. Children continue to suffer as junior citizens that have no legal 
support in their best interests.
Child welfare reformers continue to call for investigation into children’s due 
process rights issues because problems within children’s welfare continue to go unsolved. 
No policy boundaries have been established nor have any guidelines been set for agencies
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to follow in terms o f treatment of children and their rights while under the protection of 
the state. Studies performed by the Due Process Project of the Office o f Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) prove once again that children are getting the 
“short end o f the stick” in terms of standards o f due process rights protections."*’ The 
OJJDP, known as the center for analysis for children’s rights and policy, was established 
to ensure “the child’s right to fair notice o f charges, the right to be represented by 
counsel, and the right to be confronted and cross-examined by witnesses, the right to be 
protected from self-incrimination are protected (sic).”"** In doing so, the Due Process 
Project examined the causes of inadequate counsel and offered solutions to protect 
children’s legal rights, which included philosophies o f interagency collaboration. The 
establishment o f this project proves that children have minimal due process rights 
protections; it demonstrates that child advocates still feel the need to investigate rights 
issues in child welfare. If a problem did not exist, there would be no need to address it.
Incentive dollars within policies reflect states’ interests in balancing budgets 
versus the desire for legal clarification o f the best interests o f children. Legislative 
attempts were once again made during the I980’s in response to rising statistics of 
children ending up and remaining in foster care for extended periods o f time."*® The 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, enacted in 1980, mandated that ‘reasonable 
efforts’ be made to keep families together. ‘Reasonable efforts’ were not specifically 
defined, thus leaving interpretation o f this policy open and unstable. Federal support, in
Jodi Lane and Susan Turner, “Interagency Collaboration in Juvenile Justice; Learning From 
Experience,” Federal Probation Centenary of the Juvenile Justice System, Vol.63, No.2, Dec. 1999, 33-39. 
Ibid.
In 1985, almost three hundred thousand children were in foster care. That number nearly doubled by 
1996. Of five hundred thousand children currently in foster care, about one-third will not go home; 
therefore, a safe and healthy place is needed for this third of the population of foster children 
Susan Whitelaw Downs, Child Welfare and Family Services; Policies and Practice, 6*'' Ed. (New York; 
Pearson Education, 1999).
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the form o f financial incentives by the government, was given to agency efforts in 
preservation o f the family. Those incentive dollars reflected interests in bringing states to 
balance budgets rather than interest in assisting in the protection o f children’s best 
interests and their due process rights. It is difficult to comply with rights protections if 
there is no definition of rights. The focus o f our Constitution and strength of our 
democracy was to assign rights to all citizens and to the state, not focus on balancing 
budgets in exchange for rights. Incentive dollars do not hold the strength o f positive 
policy in the definition and protection o f due process rights.
In order to appease growing dissatisfaction with child welfare systems and in 
recognition of reform efforts, the Adoption Safe Families Act (ASFAj was enacted 
November 19, 1997. It is considered the most significant piece o f legislation affecting 
foster children today.’® ASFA was enacted to clarify the ‘reasonable efforts’ requirement 
in processing abused and neglected children. ASFA was enacted to ensure that children 
are placed in a timely manner. If children are placed in permanent homes within the 
guidelines set by ASFA, then federal funding will be allocated for each child that exceeds 
the minimum number o f children placed from the previous year. For every child adopted 
beyond the number o f adoptions in the previous year, the federal government pays states 
a bonus of four thousand dollars per each special needs child and six thousand dollars for 
foster care adoption programs.”  Considering this, the separation o f children from their 
families may be more likely since budgetary incentives are provided for timely 
permanent placements, thus overlooking best interests o f children that the Juvenile Court 
Act tried to address.
Steve Christian, 1998 State Legislative Responses to ASFA o f 1997, State Legislative Report, Vol. 24, 
No. 5, March 1999.
Timothy Roche, “The Crisis o f Foster Care”. Time Vol. 156, Issue 20:74.
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Legal dignity must be afforded to children by ensuring that they are treated justly 
by the state. While many cases involving improper living environments are related to 
drug abuse or mental health related issues/^ it is also very difficult for professionals to 
assess when it is appropriate to take children out o f (what are considered) substandard 
environments, away from the only family the children have known. Nonetheless, when 
making and processing these decisions, there should be a certain standard that 
professionals can follow, one that goes beyond a set o f ambiguous guidelines and 
definitions like “reasonable efforts.” These guidelines must address the fact that taking a 
child out o f an unfit home is not parallel to saving an abused pet; it is not as simple as 
replacing shelter. Children are rational emotional creatures and must be recognized as 
such. We must take into consideration that in order for children to grow up healthy and 
have a fair start in life, they need to bond and to trust for healthy emotional, intellectual, 
and moral development.^^ There must be a humane alternative that provides dignity to 
children by ensuring that they are treated sensitively by both their parents and by the 
state.
Provisions o f the ASF A require that it must be found at the first court ruling 
concerning the child’s removal from home^"* that a continuation in the home is contrary to 
the welfare o f the child. If the state fails to make this necessary ruling, then the child’s 
stay in care is ineligible for any Title IV-E funding delineated by the Social Security 
Act.^^ The state agencies depend largely on this funding to meet budgetary needs, but this
Rick Thoma, “A Critical Look at the Foster Care System,” Lifting the Veil: Examining the Child 
Welfare, Foster Care and Juvenile Justice Systems, 2002.
Liz Wood, “Participation and Learning in Early Childhood,” Children as Citizens. (Philidelphia: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers, 1998).
Whether temporary or not.
Social Security Act (42 USC 670)
44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
does not mean that they must comply with the provisions of the policy; they only need to 
comply if  they want to qualify for funding. If the state fails to make the necessary rulings 
then it cannot be remedied at a later date, unless a brand new case is brought before the 
court regarding a new set o f circumstances.
The ASFA also shortens deadlines to speed permanency hearings that require the 
courts to establish a permanent living arrangement for the child. Plans for permanency 
include the return o f the child to his or her parents, initiation o f proceedings to terminate 
parental rights, placing the child up for adoption, referring the child for legal 
guardianship, or placing the child with a fit and willing relative. Other options require 
the state agency to document a plan o f compelling reason to be filed with the court within 
the first thirty days o f the child coming into state custody. Findings for permanent 
placement must be made within twelve months upon entrance into foster care. If a state 
fails to hold a permanency hearing for a child it would be out o f compliance with the 
guidelines set by ASFA, but the agency would still be eligible for Title IV-E funding. 
Again, compliance to ASFA is not required unless the agency wants to qualify for 
funding. There is no legal form of redress if agencies do not place children in a timely 
manner or comply with other ASFA requirements. This leaves no consequence when 
States’ employees mis-handle situations including other bureaucratic flaws involving the 
life of already traumatized children. No responsibility is taken for errors and the only one 
that suffers is the child who is waiting to go home. This child not only suffers, but also 
has no means to check or remedy the misfortune o f systemic flaws within the current 
child welfare system, which is our concern here.
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The priority o f the current juvenile justice system is to get the child out o f the 
child welfare system as soon as possible, but this has been through funding incentives 
rather enactment o f policies that positively protect their best interests. Now, with the 
emphasis on permanency, too many children are separated from loving but disadvantaged 
families,^^ which also contradicts the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 
enacted just 19 years earlier, which focused on keeping families together. Ensuring that a 
child’s stay in state care is protected by a minimum standard o f core rights’ due process 
protections must be addressed. The underlying premise o f ASFA is to get the child a 
home quickly, but this process seems to overlook the legal dignity o f a child.
If the Juvenile Court Act established that children should be dealt with in a certain 
manner by the courts and if  we must consider that the focus was to be sensitive to the 
type o f persons children are, then shouldn’t the juvenile court continue with that tradition 
by establishing standards o f children’s due process rights and protect their best interests, 
especially in terms of placing children who have no homes? It is doubtful that the aim of 
the state is to find a place to for a child to “crash” until a stable home is provided. State 
standards must be established. The intent is to ensure that the child’s rights are protected 
and that the child is treated with as much dignity as possible while under the 
circumstances that he or she might be in. This is a rupture between intent and result as a 
systematic flaw.
Ambiguous terms and weak child welfare policies govern how the state processes 
abused and neglected children today. “Although trends are emerging from case law, the
Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy: Race. Poverty, and the Underclass. (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1993).
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decisions with respect to these issues are not u n ifo rm ,s ta te s  author Dorothy Roberts. 
Neither the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act nor ASFA clearly define what 
‘reasonable efforts’ are. They do not define in law the “compelling reasons why 
termination o f parental rights would be in the child’s best interests.” *^ These two policies 
illustrate the split between intentions, by providing another example o f shifting 
organizational logic, in that the former encourages reunification with the family and the 
latter encourages permanent placement, entailing separation from the family. It has been 
revealed that without a proper definition o f children’s rights, child welfare policies have 
continued and will continue to fail to meet the needs of abused and neglected children 
who deserve due process rights protections; political incentives that protect ambiguous 
references to rights such as ‘best interests’ or ‘reasonable efforts’ fail in their function.
Recent policy history suggests that both the philosophy of child welfare and the 
means of care have continued to adapt to social trends, while the number o f emotionally 
charged issues increases as they go without reasonable or effective care. Very few 
effective monitoring mechanisms o f the Juvenile Court exist today as, “Mistaken or 
malevolent uses o f state power have rarely been considered as possibilities demanding 
measures or concem.”^^  Mistakes made in the development of child welfare are repeated 
today as philosophies o f child welfare polices continue to conflict, child welfare policies 
are used as political bargaining tools, or the policies lack positive strength to uphold law. 
Efforts have been made throughout the history o f child welfare policy to address the 
socio-legal issues resulting from the largely unchecked powers of parens patriae and the
Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy: Race. Poverty, and the Underclass. (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1993)46.
Child Welfare Project, 1998 State Legislative Report.
Francis A. Allen, The Borderland o f Criminal Justice. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 126-7.
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Juvenile Court Act o f 1899, but they have not resulted in an effeetive definition o f any 
children’s rights. Current policies like The Adoption Safe Families Act continue to lack 
effective means o f protecting the rights o f  children, as they do not hold the power to 
enforce law. Instead, policies are used as bargaining tools that utilize monetary 
ineentives to get states to protect the interests o f children. The states’ compliance in 
balancing budgets and using monetary incentives only reveals that states may comply, if 
they so desire, to policy demands, but are not subject to policy demands. This is not in 
the best interest o f abused and neglected ehildren.
Rather then increasing the opportunity for children and the families to exercise 
their due process rights, public agencies have instead limited access to rights protections 
by separating their status as citizens. The next chapter will compare the nature of the 
relationship that the state has with adults as citizens versus the relationship the state has 
with children as junior citizens in terms o f human rights protections and definition of due 
process rights. The main focus will demonstrate that adults with the aid of positive law 
have the opportunity, wisdom, and comradery necessary to induce ehange in the system 
that affects them, while children lack the power to utilize these democratic means to 
initiate and affect change in policy that affects them. The next chapter will demonstrate 
and determine the need for positive law by definition o f children’s due process rights.
48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4
THE NEED FOR POSITED RIGHTS 
IN CHILD WELFARE 
It will be shown in this chapter that the legal philosophy o f juvenile justice and 
child welfare must change. Currently child welfare relies too heavily on moral 
principles and unposited rights. These elements o f law rest upon the philosophy that has 
also influenced Ronald Dworkin^®, leaving the best interests of children protected not by 
structural and procedural requirements, but by policies that are subject to the whims and 
changing philosophies o f society. As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the current philosophy 
that child welfare rests upon has proven to be unsuccessful as numbers o f abused and 
neglected children continue to rise and their needs go unmet. In order to protect them, a 
positive definition o f due process rights for children must be enacted.
It will be shown that by enacting due process rights, we are following the true 
philosophy o f the social contract, and that children do not need equal rights, they need 
parallel rights. Law can act as an avenue of definition and protection of children’s best 
interests. When confronted with state intervention in their liberty, abused and neglected 
children deserve the assurance o f posited due process rights. Positive definition of 
children's due process rights will provide a distinct guideline or reference in protecting
Political philosophy based on moral reading of the Constitution. Dworkin argues that the Bill of Rights 
must be understood as setting out general moral principles about liberty and equality and dignity. Ronald 
Dworkin, “Natural Law Revisited,” 34 U. FLA L. REV. 165 (1982).
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junior citizens o f the social contract, rather than relying on the ambiguity o f the current 
method, which utilizes policies such as the ASFA to get states to comply with procedural 
requirements and philosophies in child welfare.
It is the overall responsibility o f the state and the citizens to ensure that rights are 
articulated and protected when liberties are at issue. Because children are not 
constitutionally recognized, liberty issues lose their significance because they are not 
protected by the Bill o f Rights. The concern then, is political interests that are an effect 
o f policies that are founded in paternal powers. To further our discussion, the concepts of 
social contract, rights, law, and citizenship will be addressed in order to establish where 
children’s rights fit in. The ideas of Mary Anne Glendon in her book Rights Talk, and 
Brian Orend in Human Rights, Concept and Context will be used to clarify these 
concepts.
It must be recognized that even if  children are not able to hold Constitutional 
autonomy, they are still deserving of parallel Constitutional protection in cases o f state 
intervention or invasion.^’ Protection o f rights under our social contract requires 
democratic processes. When excluded from these processes, the rights o f certain 
populations (children) are left subject to paternal policies, which can interfere with liberty 
if the system lacks oversight. In legal decision-making, a standard requiring clear and 
convincing evidence in individual cases (instead o f the current measure o f reasonable 
efforts in terms of child welfare) should be in place. Currently, child welfare policies 
rely on ambiguous terms in policy enforcement. It is nowhere defined what “reasonable 
efforts” are in the Adoption Safe Families Act or the Child Welfare Act o f  1980 or
Invasion, in our case refers to children being taken into state custody.
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anywhere else. The measure of clear and convincing evidence establishes a standard 
when weighing interests against each other in terms of positive rights. Because children 
are incapable o f making many legal and constitutional rights claims, there should be a 
high standard for invasion o f their privacy, not an undefined measure such as “reasonable 
efforts”.
The adoption o f responsibility by the state for the welfare o f children has 
increased with time, but the scope o f this paternal responsibility has never been 
adequately defined. Once the state intervenes in the life of a child his or her rights 
become a matter of public interest. In cases o f abuse and neglect, when children are taken 
from their parents, their rights are shifted from the private realm to the public realm of 
rights. Both public and private rights must be protected. The direct responsibility for 
children’s lives is assumed by the state, a social institution, under the doctrine o f parens 
patriae. Social institutions result from and act to balance state and private interests and 
they must be regulated in liberty issues o f all citizens. Children are incapable o f being 
rationally responsible for duty or obligation to law; therefore we must recognize that they 
are incapable o f checking influential powers. In order to hold social institutions 
accountable, Brian Orend suggests that there must be a system of democratic entitlement, 
a division o f power that acts as a system of checks and balances, and the number of 
institutions needs to be controlled.^^ This follows one of the concepts o f the social 
contract, namely the power o f oversight by citizens.
The philosophy of our entire legal system is based on the notion o f the social 
contract. All legal policies and practices follow from this philosophy. The social 
contract protects rights, making appeals to justice couched in terms o f rights. Rights
■ Brian Orend, Human Rights. Concept and Context. (New York: Broadview Press, 2002), 145.
51
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rhetoric plays a key role in terms o f establishing due process rights within our social 
contract. In order to secure the protection and stability of an effective government that 
upholds coveted rights, members or the social contract agree to give up certain private 
rights. Our Constitution defines and protects our rights as citizens, but this only applies 
to adults. This does not mean that the philosophy of the social contract stops with adults, 
as children are still members of our society even if  they are not politically active. All our 
justice and political systems follow from this philosophy. Our children are future citizens 
and are owed some measure o f respect and fairness as children.
Law provides formal procedures for review and redress. Rights o f children are 
implied through state protection but they are never defined. To define what due process 
rights children have or should have we must first address what rights are and what type of 
rights will be the focus our discussion. Rights are not property; they are reasons to treat 
people in certain ways. Orend defines a ‘right’ as something that is morally or socially 
correct, a fair claim, and an entitlement to a privilege or immunity.
There are three main categories o f rights: natural, legal, and moral. Natural rights 
are first level rights and they are rights retained by every person. Our Constitution 
protects natural rights through law. In order to secure rights we must act according to the 
social contract. The venue of child welfare relies heavily on moral law as it functions 
under no positive definition of children’s due process rights. Some philosophers, such as 
Klaus F her, claim that the definition o f law “must be entirely free o f moral notions,” ^  
because moral law contains no concrete avenue to enforce socially accepted norms. 
Legal rights and moral rights can both be socially constructed norms o f a society. The
Brian Orend, Human Rights. Concept and Context. (New York: Broadview Press, 2002), 16 
Jules L. Coleman (Editor), Kenneth Himma (Editor), Scott J. Shapiro (Editor), Oxford Handbook of
Jurisprudence and Philosophv of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 4.
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difference is that legal rights are positive in that they are rights certified by law, backed 
with force and sanction. The center o f Hart’s argument for rights and law is liberty. He 
proposes that if  one has any special rights, then one must have a general right to liberty. 
Orend explains this reasoning by stating, “For anyone to make use o f a specific 
entitlement to do, or have, something, that person must at least have a general 
background entitlement to the very freedom required to do that something, or come to 
have as the case may be...Thus if  someone has any special rights at all, be they moral or 
legal, then that person must also have the human right to liberty.
Until now, the Juvenile Court has failed to show steady levels o f positive 
outcomes because it functions by retaining only some legal values and some moral 
values. Moral rights are unwritten rules that society heeds as a code o f conduct. Moral 
rights can be the roots o f legal rights, as in the case of battering another person. Legal 
rights on the contrary do not need to be morally justifiable, such as paying one’s taxes. 
Legal philosophers will argue whether law can function without a moral basis. H.L.A. 
Hart and Ronald Dworkin differ in their philosophies as to whether law is based on merit 
and where morality stands in terms of law. Our rights are legally protected under the 
function o f a positivist philosophy. Where there is law there can also be morality. Just 
because it is posited that law and morality can be intertwined does not mean that it does 
so well. The issue is whether rights, if  posited, can be protected or confined. The lack of 
positive due process rights for children has had an influence on the repeated failures o f 
the child welfare system. Therefore the system must change. To do so we must turn to 
positive rights.
Brian Orend, Human Rights. Concept and Context. (New York: Broadview Press, 2002), 92
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Law obligates. Legal validity requires citizens to do or abstain from actions. 
Children cannot be obligated to perform duties due to their age and inexperience. Law 
requires citizens to act without regard to our individual self-interest and to act in the 
public interest. “To make moral demands on their compliance is to stake out a certain 
territory, to invite certain kinds o f support and, possibly opposition. It is precisely 
because law makes these claims that doctrines of legitimacy and political obligation take 
the shape and importance that they do.”^^  Law acts as a reference that can correct policies 
that rely upon such ambiguous terms as “reasonable efforts” .
While it is possible that moral values can stem from the existence o f law, legal 
positivism requires only that it be in virtue o f its facticity rather than its meritoriousness 
that something is law, and that we can describe that facticity without assessing its 
m erits .A m b ig u o u s  terms within policies decrease force. Solid commands o f law, 
whether correct or not, act as definition and as a reference. There may be no claims to 
basic governmental services in the Constitution, but the state must not fail in the duties it 
assumes under the power o f parens patriae.
The absence o f a legally positive framework has left too much opportunity for the 
influence o f fashionable reform philosophies in juvenile welfare, and of judicial 
discretion in child welfare cases. One factor that persists and distinguishes the American 
welfare state from many others is the absence o f a constitutional commitment to 
affirmatively protect the well-being o f its citizens: no promises are made. Our 
Constitution is an avenue for citizens to have their interests met. By denying parallel 
protections o f parallel positive rights, the child welfare system contradicts the very
^  Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, “Legal Positivism,” (Plato Stanford, 2002) 12. 
Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, “Legal Positivism,” (Plato Stanford, 2002) 16
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philosophy that is the center o f the American legal system; it ignores the fundamental 
aspects o f the social contract.
Social contract philosophy implies that if  the state takes an interest in citizens, 
then citizens must have some rights; it does not assume that all citizens have the same 
rights. One of the objects o f the social contract is to protect majority and minority 
interests equally, yet our current dialogue regarding rights does not address different 
classes of citizens. Marc Jans states, “Children and the living conditions of children are 
fundamentally determined by the same economic, political and social powers that 
constitute the context o f the life o f adults....By exalting autonomy the way we do, we 
systematically slight the very young, the severely ill or disabled, the elderly, and those 
who care for them and impair their own ability to be independent in so doing.” *^ Law is 
manufactured according to certain social conventions. Legal validity is a function of 
certain social facts as posited by such philosophers as Jeremy Bentham. He argues that 
the principal distinguishing feature is the presence o f a sovereign, in our case the 
people.^^ Legal rules empower societies to structure their legal relations within a 
coercive framework. Nowhere in the philosophy o f the social contract does it refer to 
excluding certain classes from rights protections. The law tells us what we must do, but 
it does not tell us how to be virtuous. Law can be an open normative system as it adopts 
and enforces many other standards including social norms by promoting certain values 
and repressing others.
The proper functioning of procedure follows from clearly defined rights and 
through enactment o f law. When duties and responsibilities o f parties are clearly defined
^ Mary Aim Glendon, Rights Talk. (New York: The Free Press, 1991) 74.
^  Jeremy Bentham, The Principles o f Morals and Legislation. (New York: Prometheus Books, 1992).
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by law, it will be easier to prove in court that compliance did or did not occur. Once the 
state has intervened, it creates an obligation to provide service. Without definition of 
rights through positive law there will be no opportunity to measure injustices. The fault 
o f the juvenile court is not the rejection o f adult rights to protect children, but its failure 
to connect procedural requirements to parallel obligations by the state. Due process 
rights can protect citizens who are confronted with liberty issues. Children within state 
custody should be afforded parallel protections from state error.
Law in child welfare resembles adult law even though the philosophy behind each 
is supposed to be different. Due process protections of juveniles stem from the adult list 
o f criminal procedural protections. While venues are separate and safeguards differ, 
practices imitate procedure from the adult court system. “Focused exclusively on adult- 
derived rights, the Court produced a juvenile justice system whose procedures are poorly 
designed to meet its goals and out of step with c h i l d h o o d . W h e n  defining due process 
procedures for children it is possible to address children’s needs in compliance with the 
philosophy o f the legal system as a whole. Currently some due process protections do 
exist for children, but they mimic the rights essential in an adult court and do not properly 
address the needs o f juveniles.
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act only states that children should be dealt with 
differently by a different legal system; it does not sufficiently define how. In order to 
protect the welfare o f children, any new policies created must follow a guideline o f law 
that defines and protects procedural rights, even if  those rights are different than the 
rights of adults. It is impossible to make a claim on something that is neither defined nor
Emily Buss, “The Missed Opportunity in Gault,” University o f Chicago Law Review 39, (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago, 2003) 2.
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recognized. According to Hans Kelsen, law is an indirect system of guidance: it does not 
tell subjects what to do; it tells officials what to do to subjects under certain conditions.^' 
By not legally defining children’s due process rights, their best interests go unprotected, 
but it is possible that by defining rights, avenues will shut down. That is the risk. 
However, through our system, when we want to protect something we characterize it as a 
right. Rights rhetoric can go both ways; the definition can either clarify or confine 
interests. Glendon states that legal positivism “makes people’s rights utterly contingent 
on whether their society has written such rights into law, it makes human rights utterly 
dependent on the whims and wishes of the most powerful in society, who exert strong 
influence in the legislatures and c o u r t s . G l e n d o n  notes the centrality of rights to the 
discussion by saying that when strong feelings about political issues are present we resort 
to the language of r i g h t s . C h i l d r e n ’s rights need to be defined; furthermore they must 
be stated through positive law.
Legal validity depends on morality, not due to interpretation but because it may 
be customarily recognized as the determinant o f legal validity. There is a great deal of 
moral reasoning in the adjudication o f law under social contract, but courts are required 
to decide the validity o f law by “explicit or implicit requirement o f statute or common 
law.” "^ Glendon states that rights talk is a language of “no compromise.”’  ^ The 
codification o f rights in law makes the practice o f such laws contingent on rights rhetoric. 
American public discourse is not only defined by what is stated but also by what is 
omitted. The interests o f children will have to be balanced with the interests o f adults.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Legal Positivism,” (Plato Stanford, 2002) 4.
Brian Orend, Human Rights. Concept and Context. (New York: Broadview Press, 2002) 74. 
Mary Aim Glendon, Rights Talk. (New York: The Free Press, 1991) 5.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Legal Positivism,” (Plato Stanford, 2002) 8.
Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk. (New York: The Free Press, 1991) 9.
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When a positive right is claimed, a negative right can be assumed out o f omission, 
entailing the logic o f inclusion and exclusion. Orend defines legal positivism of rights as 
holding that “only those rights that have been effectively codified into law, which count 
as real and legitimate.”’  ^ Law distinguishes acts from omissions. This philosophy 
requires that moral issues be argued in legal terms, which makes it difficult to review 
cases o f unjust actions towards children because no definitive guideline exists. What is 
not stated is not protected. If philosophies remain as ambiguous and elastic as they have 
been in juvenile welfare policy then it will be difficult to regulate omissions of practice. 
The current method to regulate child welfare issues is in the form o f funding for 
compliance with favored policies. Policies that allow the state the choice to comply 
contain no strength in rights protections. A positive law delineating the rights o f children 
will provide a good measure as to what the expectations of the state by its citizens are. By 
not stating what is required o f citizens, law makes no promises, thus out of omission 
creating negative rights. Negative rights are rights from certain things, usually freedoms 
from abuse or coercion by others, as opposed to positive rights, which are the rights or 
guarantees to certain things
Once rights are founded, then they can be brought before the courts and reviewed 
and changed if  necessary. Hart’s rule o f change does not entail change in rights, only 
change in law to protect founded rights. According to H.L.A. Hart’s view, every society 
with a functioning legal system retains a rule of recognition that expresses the criteria for 
legal validity, which includes provision for making, changing, and reviewing law.”  The 
source in determining law is the rule o f recognition, which specifies the ultimate criteria
Brian Orend, Human Rights. Concept and Context. (New York: Broadview Press, 2002) 74. 
Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, “Legal Positivism,” (Plato Stanford, 2002) 7.
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of validity in a legal system. It is the rule that officials appeal to in arguments about what 
standards they are bound to apply. “Positivism identifies law, not with all valid reasons 
for decision, but only with the source-based subset o f them. It is not part o f the positivist 
claim that the rule o f recognition tells us how to decide cases, or even tells us all the 
relevant reasons for decision.”
Ronald Dworkin denies that there can be any general theory o f the existence and 
content o f law. He believes that law requires merit; it does not rest wholly on facts. 
Rather than law being based on political organization, he argues that law starts with an 
“abstract ideal regulation o f the conditions under which governments may use coercive 
force over its subjects.”’  ^ For Dworkin, legal requirements are consistent with the 
interpretation of its legal practices which shows them to be best justified in light of an 
animating ideal. The coerciveness o f policies such as the Adoption Safe Families Act 
does not have the strength to act as an animating idea, nor do other current child welfare 
policies.
Without a proper framework, child welfare policies are incapable of following a 
succinct philosophy. Children are recognized by the enactment o f policies addressing 
their population, but these policies fall under no defined boundary. As shown in Chapter 
3, within 10 years two significant child welfare policies enacted consisted o f conflicting 
philosophies. The 1980 Child Welfare Act encouraged reunification o f children with 
their families, while the 1990 Adoption Safe Families Act did not encourage reunification 
but rather permanent placement. These policies are not held under a unifying framework
Ibid. 7. 
™ Ibid. 6.
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that spells out the rights o f children. In doing so, rights are redefined when a new policy 
is created.
There must be a legal means to correct these unjust practices without being 
retributive. On both ends, either the parent is punished too harshly, or not harshly enough 
while children linger in the system. Courts have been willing to hold government 
agencies liable when found negligent in their duties, especially if  liberty is an issue in 
negligence. Cases regarding child welfare have been brought before the Supreme Court, 
but very few cases have based their findings on Constitutional validity. Mary Ann 
Glendon accurately describes the negative effects, “Lacking an adequate linguistic or 
conceptual apparatus to deal with the intermediate institutions that stand between the 
individual and the state, we regularly overlook the effects o f laws and policies upon the 
environment within which societies flourish and the settings upon which individuals 
depend for their full and free development.”*'' The venue o f child welfare relies too 
heavily on the moral notions o f treatment of children; these moral notions have no 
strength without legal definition to back them up. Legal validity depends on morality 
because morality is customarily recognized as an ultimate determinant in establishing 
law. First, it cannot be held that qualities of law are philosophically relevant because 
societal sources o f the moral ideas claim it as such. Moral language injudicial decisions 
does not establish moral tests for law because sources can come from various avenues but 
still influence decisions according to legal rules. Law must define what due process 
rights children have as junior citizens; this will provide the opportunity for claim and 
redress. If  there is nothing to claim, then one can state that there is no issue at hand, but
^ Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk. (New York: The Free Press, 1991),
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it is clear that there are many unjust practices within the child welfare system that have 
been continually repeated from one generation to the next.
The Juvenile Court leaves much discretion to its judges. Both the state’s attorney 
and the parent’s attorney can cite “best interests” but both have a different underlying 
agenda and fundamental incentives concerned with representing their client’s proper 
service. It is very difficult for redress due to lack o f Constitutional guidelines if  there is 
an error in a decision or other procedures that follow from intake. This leaves few 
options to children who suffer from poor decision-making on the part of judges, and poor 
policy practice while children linger in the system. “We assign blame and responsibility 
differently when we think that a bad decision was mandated by law than we do when we 
think that it flowed from a judge’s exercise o f moral or political judgment”*’. We must 
stay away from confusing personal notions of morality with what is legal or not legal. 
Pojman argues, “Law is defeasible in term o f morality (but not vice versa).”*’ He goes on 
to point out that law distinguishes itself from morality in reference to scope and sanction 
to adhere to. He argues that the concern o f law is “acts versus attitudes”. Oliver Wendal 
Holmes Jr., in The Path o f  Law, denounced the confusion between legal and moral ideas 
as he asserted that a distinction between them was of the first importance for rights study 
and mastery o f law.*’
Judges can make decisions under a legal duty to make them in a certain way. 
This does not mean that their decision will always have the same outcomes; it only 
provides the same boundaries to justification. Law is not an end, as it does not make
Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, “Legal Positivism,” (Plato Stanford, 2002) 9.
^  Louis P. Pojman, Moral Philosophy (A Reader), (New York: Hacked Publishing Company 1995) 3.
Steven J. Burton (Editor), Gerald Postema (Editor), The Path o f the Law and its Influence: The Legacv of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Jr.. (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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decisions; it should only provide a means to outline reasoning in decisions. Law cannot 
address the multiple issues that abused and neglected children are faced with, but it can 
be used to provide an outline as to how children’s welfare issues are handled. Juvenile 
welfare policy lacks defined oversight, which acts to check and balance those various and 
oftentimes opposing interests that propel the child welfare system.
Not only should rights be defined for the sake of definition, but children’s due 
process rights must be also be defined because they are a special class o f citizens as 
defined in the Illinois Illinois Juvenile Court Act. The status o f citizenship children have 
must be recognized in its current manifestation even if it is defined as partial. Says 
Roche, people do not enter society with coming o f age, and “they are constituted in part 
by society, and in turn constitute it.”*'' Minority groups of the population, such as 
children, need the same rights definition and protection as the majority o f citizens, at least 
to some extent. Mary Ann Glendon tells in her book Rights Talk, that rights dominate 
the notion o f citizenship from top to bottom. Citizens are afforded certain protections as 
members o f a social contract. By the state showing interest in the welfare o f its citizens, 
it creates a relationship under the social contract that necessitates guidelines within that 
contract. As future citizens, children deserve parallel protections from the abuse of 
overly paternal policies that have no oversight. She points out that the Supreme Court 
refers to citizenship as the right to have rights.*’ Therefore future citizens should have 
the first beginnings o f rights rather than none at all.
Roche tells us that the language o f citizenship and rights can be used to critically 
analyze the ways in which children are treated and positioned within our society since
Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk. (New York: The Free Press, 1991) 73. 
Trop V. Dulles, 356 US 86, 102 (1958) Warren Court.
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“children are often rendered silent and invisible by attitudes and practices o f adult 
society.”*^  Their social position makes it difficult for them to claim these rights. The 
traditional response to children traps them in a position o f simply being governed.”*’ It is 
difficult to correct an error in processing abused or neglected children. As junior citizens, 
children should be protected from this error.
There have been some court cases bringing to question what rights children do 
have. As well, policies have been formed in an attempt to define child rights. But none 
have specifically defined what rights children do have. When considering what rights 
children have one must consider, as we have discussed, the types o f rights that exist and 
the rhetoric o f rights. The possession of rights entails correlative duties and obligations 
as implicated in the social contract. Some may say that because children cannot be 
obligated to the social contract, that they should not have rights; having rights entails 
obligations. It is understood through action o f the Illinois Juvenile Court Act that 
children are incapable of performing correlative duties, but that does not mean that they 
should not have rights. That is to say that when one claims to have a right to something 
they must have a well-grounded concrete claim on the actions o f other people, because 
when a right is claimed it affects not only the possessor but also those around him who 
must respect this right. The problem that the juvenile court faces is that analysts rely on 
the rhetoric o f  rights, which allows only adult rights or no rights. To determine what kind 
of rights children are entitled to we must also determine if  children are citizens and define 
what type o f citizen they are. Neither adult rights nor no-rights will secure fairness in
’ Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights. Participation and Citizenship. (London: Sage Publications), 1-2.
Ibid. 12
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child welfare procedures. A coherent set o f rights must be established through 
citizenship, then due process rights can be posited through positive law.
In our case, children are the minority subset that needs the protection by the 
majority, adults. The design of government was meant for the main protection of 
individual or minority rights from the tyranny of the majority. If adults cannot clearly 
define what rights children do have, then it is even more difficult for children to have 
their interests protected. “Our legal and political vocabularies deal handily with rights- 
bearing individuals, market actors, and the state, but they don’t afford us a ready way of 
bringing into focus smaller groups and systems where the values and practices that 
sustain our republic are shaped, practiced, transformed, and transmitted from one 
generation to the next.”** Currently, children are incapable o f making rights claims, 
which makes them dependent on the rhetoric of rights and on adults to act as 
representatives to protect their due process rights. Effectively, adults often claim 
citizenship rights for children by doing so on their behalf.
There are three main types o f citizenship: civil, political, and social. Civil 
citizenship involves personal liberties such as freedom of speech. Children have 
potential civil citizenship, and recognition o f the rights that derive from civil citizenship 
increase as children get older. Political citizenship entails participation such as voting. 
Children have little if  any participation in political citizenship; they can voice their views 
openly, and freely assemble but not vote. The social dimension o f citizenship entails not 
only the basic issues o f economic welfare but it also includes the right to live life 
according to the standards of society. *^  Children can be said to retain social citizenship
’ Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk. (New York: The Free Press, 1991) 120.
’ Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights. Participation and Citizenship. (London: Sage Publications) 7.
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as their interests are recognized by society. Citizenship is linked to the concern for 
rights. Although children are not participating citizens, the state still does recognize them 
as potential citizens by taking an interest in them; we will refer to children as ‘junior 
citizens’.
The interest that our state holds in its citizens is proof that the state is compelled 
by responsibility for its citizens’ welfare. This includes children as dependents, as 
provided by the doctrine o f parens patriae. When identifying how the law treats its 
dependents one can consider the legal case of Nancy Cruzan.^" Cruzan was an adult, but 
became a dependent once she was unable to thrive on her own or communicate her needs. 
Children are dependents as well, and it is not reasonable to compare them to the 
dependency of persons in prison, as children are not criminals. Child rights could also 
possibly be examined through investigation of the rights of the mentally disabled, but for 
the purposes of our discussion the case o f Nancy Cruzan will be more helpful.
Nancy Cruzan was a young woman who was critically injured in an automobile 
accident. Her parents sought a court order directing the withdrawal o f their daughter’s 
artificial feeding and hydration after it became apparent that she had no chance of 
recovering her cognitive functions. It was found that the United States Constitution does 
not forbid Missouri to require an incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal o f life, as 
sustaining treatment was to be proved by a standard o f clear and convincing evidence. In 
1988 the Missouri Supreme Court had recognized a competent person’s right to refuse 
treatment as part of the doctrine o f informed consent. For decisions to be made on behalf 
o f an incompetent patient, however, the court required "clear and convincing" evidence 
that the patient would have wanted treatment terminated under such circumstances. As
^  Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept, o f  Health 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)
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an adult, Cruzan had defined her desires; these were protected, unlike children who could 
never articulate their desires or interests. Regardless o f her desires, the courts sought to 
balance her interests through proper process o f law. The court decided to "err on the side 
o f life," where what was at issue was not Nancy’s "right to die," but the right of others to 
take her life. Children’s rights should be defined as much to give children due process 
rights, as to define how the state handles juvenile processes under state care. The decision 
and the reasoning for the Cruzan decision have many important factors that can be used 
in considering the definition o f child rights and definition o f the protections o f due 
process rights. It established what a state must do when the interest o f a citizen’s rights 
comes to question. A dependent person like Cruzan was considered to be partially within 
the custody of the state as are foster children. In both cases, interests among the state, the 
guardians and the dependents were at issue and have some weight in the disposition of 
the original interest (Cruzan, or foster children).
The Cruzan case established that the duty o f the state is to protect the interest the 
state has in its dependents, which has been the case in child welfare. It has been shown 
that the strength o f child welfare policies has been embedded in the state’s interest in 
child welfare rather than the protection o f child welfare interests. This is not a play on 
rhetoric, it is a recognition of how child welfare philosophy functions. When coming to 
the decision in the case of Cruzan, the state took into consideration the rights o f Cruzan 
as a citizen with dignity, not as a non-functioning adult. This is not how child welfare 
policies are practiced. Children, as defined by the Illinois Juvenile Court Act o f  1899, are 
specified as different citizens, and are addressed this way. The Cruzan case does not 
even permit this reasoning. It may be because she was an adult who defined her wishes
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prior to her accident, but the fact remains that just like a child, she required others to act 
as guardians to protect her best interests.
The reasoning in this case was reviewed in comparison with the other case o f 
medical disability. In re Quinlan.^^ The case of Karen Quinlan also brought to issue the 
right o f privacy o f dependents. The reasoning o f the decision balanced the right o f 
Quinlan versus asserted state interests. It was noted that the state’s interest weakens and 
the individual’s right to privacy grows as the degree o f bodily invasion increases and in 
Quinlan’s case the prognosis dims. But to pursue the parallel, it can be said that when the 
state takes custody o f a child the degree o f bodily invasion is high, even if  it is not full 
medical dependency; it is dependency for everything that a growing child needs, making 
it quite invasive. In addition, when a child lingers in foster care for years into possible 
adulthood, the prognosis for the child can also be dim as shown in the earlier chapters’ 
evidence o f statistics.
Again, it is recognized that these women were not children, but adults who are 
protected by full Constitutional rights. But their rights were protected by law because 
they were defined positively; not specifically as dependents but as citizens. In 
comparison, these women were as helpless as infants who are left to foster care. These 
women had the same level o f social contractual obligation o f an infant. It is posited that 
children cannot be defined as full citizens because they cannot make binding legal 
decisions nor enter into contract, but neither could Ms. Cruzan or Ms. Quinlan. Still, the 
state took interest in their welfare because they were citizens, not because there was a 
certain type of citizen (as does the Illinois Juvenile Court Act).
In re Quinlan 10, 355 A.2d 647
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A child is considered incompetent; philosophers and psychologists have claimed 
for thousands o f years that children are not fully rational and that their irrationality is the 
basis for adult guidance. In protection o f child welfare, this same reasoning should be 
recognized and utilized. It has been shown that the current method of reasoning has been 
quite unsuccessful if  not unjust. Children are not invalids, they are not prisoners, they are 
not immigrants; they are junior citizens, and deserve the recognition as potential citizens 
who are incapable o f independence but are deserving of legal dignities and something 
more positive than “no-rights”.
Just because the legal definition o f children differs from adults, it should not mean 
that the legal system should lack a parallel framework that establishes guidelines for law. 
Autonomy should not be a precondition for any individual’s protection o f rights. The 
only real precondition is that the community is willing to recognize and allow the 
individual to make claims and participate in the shifting of boundaries. Due to 
indeterminacy or conflict o f legal rules, judges are left to exercise discretion to make new 
law. Vague statutes like the Adoption Safe Families Act, do not define what “reasonable 
efforts” are, and so they often provide the courts with too much discretion and may not 
reflect the best interests of children. This may, and does lead to decisions that are not in 
the best interest o f either children or their families or subsequently society in general. 
“Judges fail to understand that they are often using their own middle-class scale values to 
determine neglect. As a result, the child is often hurt more severely by being removed 
unnecessarily from his home.” ’^ Discretionary arguments are not wholly arbitrary. 
Effective decisions must be guided by merit-based considerations. They can also be 
guided by law even if there is no specific law pertaining to the issue at hand. Judges may
Joseph M. Hawes, The Children’s Rights Movement (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1991) 38.
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have to make new decisions, but they have to make them in a particular way, according to 
the way law functions, such as in conformity to the spirit o f the law or with positive 
moral standards.
It is possible that the definition o f children’s rights through establishment o f law 
may have little effect on the intrinsic processes that govern child welfare. But since there 
are so many injustices within the child welfare system, there must be a guideline to 
address these injustices even if  it may later be found to be needing improvement. There 
must be a fixed point o f reference to assist the juvenile system in its functioning. In this 
way, “Hobbes is right: any order is better than chaos and in some circumstances may be 
achievable only through positive law.”^^  Legal systems appraise what is just or unjust. If 
there is no law, there can be no measure o f justice.
Law is necessary in defining what is expected from the state and its citizens. It 
has been shown in this chapter that current child welfare policies recognize children as 
citizens, but they do not define how children as citizens should be addressed, other than 
through a separate legal venue. Law must be established as an avenue defining what kind 
of due process rights children do have. Law acts as a measure o f state and civil conduct. 
Glendon states, “Highly visible acknowledgements o f governmental obligations to the aid 
of citizens in need, and judicial affirmations o f those obligations, can help to promote 
responsiveness and responsibility in the political process”. '^' This must also apply to 
children. Moves to promote the welfare o f children, which include a commitment to the 
child’s view o f their welfare, can be supportive o f a practice, which is respectful of the
Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, “Legal Positivism,” (Plato Stanford, 2002) 11. 
Mary Aim Glendon, Rights Talk. (New York; The Free Press, 1991) 100.
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rights of children. The context will often shape the extent to which the child’s voice will 
be determinative.
In order for the state to meet the best interests o f children, this analysis has 
demonstrated that the current philosophy governing children’s rights (or lack thereof) and 
laws protecting their rights cannot steer far from the philosophy o f the social contract. It 
has been shown that the lack o f positive law defining children’s legal rights in child 
welfare conflicts with the legal philosophy o f our current political system. It has also 
been demonstrated that positive law not only sets standards for the conduct o f citizens, 
but also functions in setting a standard o f conduct by the state. Finally, it was shown that 
American legal philosophy relies on the power o f the people to protect both the majority 
and the minority as well by recognizing levels o f citizenship. Positive definition of 
children’s due process will establish a means to the rights needed in child welfare. Once 
an avenue is established, there will be a reference point to rights; adults have the Bill of 
Rights, children have nothing. The next chapter will discuss possible solutions in 
positively defining children’s rights properly.
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CHAPTER 5
IDENTIFICATION OF CHILDREN’S 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
It has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that children’s due process rights 
with regard to abused and neglected children (rather than delinquents) have not been 
thoroughly identified by positive law at the state or federal level, thus preventing policies 
from protecting the best interests o f children. This chapter will suggest enactment o f a 
Dependency Clause to child welfare laws throughout the states that addresses concepts of 
participation, representation, and citizenship in relation to children as dependents. 
Without positive reference for ehildren’s due process rights, policies like ASFA, which 
use monetary coercion along with the vague defenses in the child’s best interests; these 
inevitably lack strength in protection o f abused and neglected children with regard to 
juvenile justice. To ensure due process rights protections o f dependents, it must be 
posited by law that dependents are a certain type o f junior citizen that need due process 
protections and representation that are parallel to the adult system.
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act has demonstrated that children do not have equal 
rights, yet some adult due process rights have been afforded to them, thus creating 
conflict by reverting to the very system the law had tried to avoid. Unlike adults who 
retain rights under the Bill of Rights, children’s rights are ambiguous, as “reasonable 
efforts” are cited when acting in the best interests o f a child. At times, children can be
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unjustly taken from families for unreasonable periods o f time, thus leaving them to linger 
in the system. This ehapter will demonstrate that children need due process rights that 
comply to their system as established by the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, not the adult 
system. This can be accomplished by recognizing and defining the status o f citizenship 
children have by enactment of law. Once the level o f citizenship for children is legally 
defined, proper due process rights can be assigned. This will be completed by 
establishing a level o f citizenship that does not require participation. Classifications of 
citizenship demonstrate that the definition o f citizenship encompasses many dimensions. 
Roche agrees when he states, “If citizenship entails membership in the community and 
membership implies forms of social participation, then citizenship is about the 
involvement o f people in the community in which they live, and people have been barred 
from citizenship on grounds o f class, gender, race and age among many other factors. 
Accordingly, the debate on citizenship requires us to think about the very nature o f the 
conditions o f membership and political participation.”^^
Currently, children are not citizens in the Constitutional sense, which is why they 
are unable to bring rights issues to the legal system. But children are social citizens as 
they enter the public sphere the day they are bom. The various Child welfare laws 
throughout the country have assigned them some adult due process rights; this conflicts 
with the intended separation created by the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. This separation 
implies that a different status o f citizen does exist, but it does not define how to process 
this “type” o f citizen. That does not mean that all laws dealing with and affecting children 
should be different, it just means that laws and legal protections should be afforded to 
them as eitizens and they must be positively defined. Without posited legal rights we, by
Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights. Participation and Citizenship. (London: Sage Publications), 20
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omittance, permit discrimination against children. What rights are the state trying to 
protect when children have been treated unjustly by the state? Rights must be defined by 
positive law in order for them to be protected and reviewed.
One o f the issues that confronts juvenile justice is representation, and the inability 
o f children to participate in democratic processes. Jeremy Roche provides a solution to 
this dilemma by positing that children should be able to participate. It has been posited 
that children should be able to represent themselves in some form, even if  not by full 
participation. Jeremy Roche notes that because participation is such an important aspect 
in the practice o f democracy, children should also be able to have some sort o f means of 
participation. Children are affected by politics and this is one o f the qualifications that 
should permit their political involvement. It is true that participation is an inevitable 
requirement o f American democracy, but many would agree that children have little if 
any capability to participate. One can argue that in order for policy to be effective it must 
reflect the needs o f the people it is trying to affect. Is it possible for children to 
participate in political processes and effectively affect the current system? Let us 
examine this issue with reference to ASFA.
Arguments made about the mental capacity o f children refer to their ability to 
participate. Just because they are capable it does not make it necessary. Capability does 
not qualify necessity. Marc Jans argues that learning is a life-long process and, “It no 
longer exclusively belongs to the domain o f school and no longer is restricted to the 
phase o f youth.”^^  Therefore, with reference to mental capabilities, philosophers like 
Jans argue that adults and children are capable of participation but are just not at the same 
maturity level. Is he positing that maturity and experience are not preconditions for
^  Marc Jans, Children and Active Citizenship. (Meise: Research Center o f Childhood and Society, 2002) 3.
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political participation? According to this argument, since both subsets are capable o f 
learning, both can be trained to participate. Realistically, this o f course does not qualify 
children to participate, because philosophers like Laura M. Purdy believe that political 
participation requires experience.
Adults, whether they are educated or not, have life experience and rights and are 
responsible to duties and obligations o f the social contract. Children, even with proper 
education, although capable o f learning, do not have enough life experience to provide 
them with rational decision-making skills that are ripe for participation in political 
processes, nor are they capable o f  legal duties nor of legal obligation. Unfortunately, 
children have to start from where they are socially positioned.
Libertarians argue that the burden o f proof should be on those trying to limit 
freedom. They assume that children are capable o f quickly coming to function at least at 
the level o f the average contemporary adult. Jans cites Hengst^^ in arguing that the 
difference between children and adults can no longer be indicated by classic modem 
frame concepts or social constmcts. Hengst also argues that children should not be 
classified as qualifying and adults as fully qualified. Purdy disagrees by stating that 
although children have the potential for rationality, they are in the process o f becoming 
rational. Being in the process o f something does not qualify it as something. An acorn is 
not a tree until it grows and matures under certain conditions.
Children are not qualified to participate; they may be educated and prepared to 
participate one day, but not while they are children. This is not to argue that adults, once 
eighteen are educated or rational enough to make sound decisions^^, it is just to state that
Marc Jans, Children and Active Citizenship, (Meise: Research Center o f Childhood and Society, 2002) 3. 
^  There are a lot o f “bad apples” out there.
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children, for the most part, do not have the maturity or experience to participate in 
political processes. In proving that children are not yet capable o f political practices, 
Purdy points to the development of children by stating, “ Despite its apparently moral 
basis, the debate about equal rights for children has been blind to an essential element in 
human development. The good life depends on moral charaeter.”^^  Yet, philosophers like 
Jeremy Roche claim that children should have a measurable political influence in the 
processes that govern them. He suggests that children should be able to provide some 
input in political processes not only because they are capable, but also because they are 
citizens and they have the right to have a say in the world that governs them. Even if 
children were allowed to participate, it would only be to a small degree, which would not 
provide the effective force needed to affect the necessary influence on policies. The idea 
to allow children to participate in political process seems irrational to most adults in our 
system today.
There are adults that retain their rights as citizens even though they are incapable 
o f participation - like children they are unable to vote or enter into contract. Quatrup 
argues that both children and adults are affected by the same environments, as he points 
out, “Childhood and the living conditions o f children are fundamentally determined by 
the same economic, political, and social powers that constitute the context o f adults.”’ 
Currently, only adults represent themselves in political processes, such as: voting for 
candidates, supporting candidates through contributions, initiation of political action, or 
choosing to run for office themselves. But there are adults who are unable to vote because 
either they are incapable or their level o f citizenship is less than others; this includes
^  Laura M. Purdy, In Their Best Interest?. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1992) 76.
Marc Jans, Children and Active Citizenship. (Meise: Research Center o f Childhood and Society, 2002)
1 .
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adults who are incarcerated, deemed mentally incapable, or have severe medical 
disability”” . As mentioned earlier, certain philosophers like Jeremy Roche believe that 
children’s rights may be defined through the political participation of children. But is 
participation o f dependents really necessary? It was demonstrated in Chapter Four that 
one who is without the conventional function o f a ‘normal’ citizen can still qualify and be 
defined as a citizen, whereas law can recognize them measurably, as in the cases of 
Cruzan and Quinlan.
It must be also argued that if  direct representation were a precondition for 
affecting political processes then cases like Nancy Cruzan (who was in a vegetative state 
and was completely reliant on feeding tubes and breathing machines), would not have 
access to the courts. Infants, certain o f the handicapped, and persons like Nancy will 
never be able to vote or appeal to public officers in their own defense. This case 
demonstrates that autonomy is not a precondition for legal rights. Even if  Ms. Cruzan did 
state that she did not want to be kept alive by machines if  an accident happened, Ms. 
Cruzan’s rights were protected not because she had desires that were expressed, but 
because she had rights as a citizen - a right to have her hest interests protected via due 
process protections. Without due process rights, her prerequested desires would never 
have been at issue, the state would have taken a paternal stance in her interest. Therefore, 
it is possible for dependent individuals to rely on representatives and law to protect their 
interests while still recognizing them as rights-bearing citizens.
Adults, without the participation o f children, can represent the needs o f children 
just as in the case o f Nancy Cruzan who, like a child, had been represented through her
Such as those who are in a comatose state like Nancy Cruzan. Marc Jans, Children and Active 
Citizenship, (Meise: Research Center o f Childhood and Society, 2002).
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parents and by the state, but note that they relied upon positive law. Adults often claim 
citizenship rights for their children and do so on their behalf, but this is not enough 
because foster children do not have parents to represent them, they have strangers who 
are social workers and lawyers proteeting their interests; moral intentions do not protect 
like positive reference to law. Intentions do not have the strength nor the linearity of 
positive law. The devotion o f a family member and the devotion o f a legal representative 
differ greatly from something as definitive as law. Families represent out o f love, the 
system’s representation does not fall under a commitment o f loyalty or kinship but out of 
devotion to the law. Therefore law must be in place to ensure that children’s rights are 
defined and protected. Legal representatives may have moral intentions but their jobs are 
to uphold law, not their moral convictions. In the protection of child welfare, one’s 
intentions can only go as far as the law. If we are to protect children with policies like 
ASFA, we must attain force by positing how and what rights are to be protected.
Policies like ASFA are not as effective as citizens may believe as they do not 
define nor protect the due process rights of children. Not only do they contain ambiguous 
provisions, but they are only effective for the duration o f a child’s stay within the system; 
they only contain the force o f persuasion rather than concrete provision. In order for 
policies to be effective, there must be rights posited at the federal level, which will guide 
processes that may differ from state to state. Otherwise, as Roche points out, children 
may “languish in foster care because neither the agency nor the child’s parents initiate the 
necessary action for change.””’^  Legal advocates for foster children only have the power 
to act during state intervention, not prior nor post. For example, the role of guardian at
Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights. Participation and Citizenship. (London: Sage Publications), 115.
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litem when procedure is done, and they have very little influenee to ensure that
the processes that legally govern abused and neglected children were fair, just or 
expedient. Legal rights guide representatives. Legal rights will exist before and after 
legal procedure is complete, they will ensure that processes are performed with review 
and reference to structure. Legal rights delineated from the federal level will guide states 
in their function o f processing children who come into contact with the state. It is the job 
of the State at the federal level to provide a guideline for the states to carry out.
Once a child has been removed from the home, the focus changes from protecting 
the parents’ legal rights to determining what is in the best interests o f the child, but under 
what definition o f rights? Without posited law, advocates, lawyers, judges and policies 
act according to undefined guidelines under what they term “reasonable efforts” . These 
types of phrases are ambiguous and can be interpreted to mean whatever the actor wants 
them to mean, whether within policy formation or for a child’s supposed defense. In 
defense of children’s best interests the phrase “reasonable efforts” has been cited in many 
forms o f legal arguments, but there is no basis or line connecting it to the same definition 
or philosophy o f child rights; there are too many gray areas that can differ from state to 
state. A federal law sets boundaries. The phrase “reasonable efforts” encompasses too 
many forms and definitions to be used to protect the best interests o f a child. Roche 
agrees by stating, “Often under the guise o f upholding the ‘child’s best interest’ judicial 
decisions are made which may adversely affect children. All types of social and legal 
decisions are ultimately rationalized to reflect the ‘best interests o f the child.’””’'’
Child welfare advocates who are appointed for adjudicatory and dispositional hearings.
Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights. Participation and Citizenship. (London: Sage Publications), 50.
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Therefore positive law delineated by the federal system along with better representation 
would be a strong first step in protecting the welfare of children within State custody.
If children need stronger representation and are recognized as different ‘persons’ 
by the states’ Juvenile Court Acts, then the state must recognize and address this; 
although children are different ‘persons’ they are still citizens and should still have some 
legal rights to assist in the processing o f children as dependent citizens in distress. To 
define the rights of children, we must take into question the adult-centered rights rhetoric. 
Citizenship is the qualifying condition that necessitates action o f government and 
protection o f posited due process rights as put forth by social contract. Our state must 
recognize differing levels o f citizenship in order to recognize due process rights of 
children. Children should therefore be afforded partial citizenship at the very least. This 
will get them the recognition they need by the government that goes past the need to 
intervene.
Children can be considered to be citizens-in-training. Partial citizenship can act as 
a bridge connecting the first two levels o f citizenship, which most adults possess, with the 
third and fourth levels of citizenship. To understand the differing levels o f citizenship 
children have we can refer to Jans as he mentions Aries’ (1962 pg. 9) concepts of 
citizenship in his book Children and Active Citizenship. In it, he states that there are four 
levels of citizenship. The first level is citizenship as a whole o f rights, which qualifies for 
the right to vote; law-abiding adults are at this level. The second level is citizenship as a 
whole o f responsibilities; this entails understanding o f the social contract by not breaking 
posited law; adults and adolescent children are at this level. The third level o f citizenship 
is citizenship as identity, which qualifies citizens to their country o f origin; this is every
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legal citizen o f a country, including children. The final level o f citizenship is citizenship 
o f participation, which recognizes community involvement; this includes all persons 
living within a eommunity that affect that community.
It was displayed in Chapter Four that the qualifications o f the social contract 
display that a sovereign takes interests in its citizens as parens patriae qualifies children 
as citizens, therefore they must have some rights as citizens. Jeremy Roche points out 
that partial citizenship “permits an avoidance o f the zero-sum thinking that 
characterizes,” the current rhetoric o f rights. He calls for us to recognize that society is 
not comprised o f two classes o f social beings, citizens and non-citizens. The fact is that 
there is a spectrum of levels o f citizens. By enacting a legal definition o f children’s 
citizenship through either a bill or declaration, we will be ensuring a good future for all 
children, especially with regard to the abused and neglected. Justice is not just about 
preserving the good life here and now, it is also about securing a good foundation for a 
just future. It is possible for there to be different levels o f citizenship with different 
levels o f rights defined. Children are citizens and in turn should have rights according to 
our social contract through interest shown by the state as displayed by parens patriae.
Some philosophers argue that the “constant referencing o f children to the future 
potentials and possibilities belittles their present actions.””’^  Children may be considered 
to be citizens-in-training. We also need to escape from the language of ‘futures’. The 
process o f law does not take into consideration what might be, only what is. If law was 
based in this consideration we can posit that adults are tombstones-in-training, they will 
die, just as children will become adults. Law would then be based on the morrow and not 
the present. Law confronts the issues o f its citizens directly, not potentiality or what will
Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights. Participation and Citizenship. (London: Sage Publications), 12.
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be at another time. With regard to children we must act in the here and now. It can be 
argued that although children have potentiality, it must not overshadow the fact that they 
exist as children today. One day they will be adults, but this does not mean that the law 
should look at what they will be in the future. Current law should not be created to 
function in protecting children as future adults; law should protect children as a different 
subset o f citizens who deserve to be treated with dignity by the legal system. The Illinois 
Juvenile Court Act states that we should recognize children as a different legal person, 
therefore law must focus on this different legal status.
Currently child welfare policy works to protect adults or adult social order 
“against disturbances from the presence of children,””’^ as the context o f rights determines 
the extent of the child’s voice. In order to define due process rights through positive law 
one must consider that if  children have empowering rights, then adults will have to 
devote their energies to protecting these interests. A conflict o f interest may exist 
between parents or adult rights and children’s rights. These conflicts can only be 
discovered and remedied through practice and judicial review. It must be ensured that 
children have a voice, and that the root o f protection be defined and protected by adults, 
as representatives for children (dependents). Empowerment o f children’s legal rights will 
call for adults to balance their interests with the interests o f children. The baseline o f 
protections will have to be administered and policed by adults, not for adults but for the 
welfare o f everyone equally. State courts will address issues if  and when they come up. 
Child welfare policy must be created at the federal level in order to make life better for 
both children and adults, not either/or. If interests conflict, then a level playing field 
within these confines must exist in order for them to be examined and not pushed aside.
' Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights. Participation and Citizenship. (London: Sage Publications) 72.
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Therefore a Dependency Clause should be added to Child welfare laws 
throughout the country, that recognizes the dependent underage citizen which also 
delineates due process rights that are parallel to adult due process rights and appropriate 
for the juvenile justice system. If posited law mandated what the legal rights o f children 
were, then there would be a clear statutory entitlement to those services; this can be done 
by identifying children as dependent citizens, who are incapable of participation. Policies 
like ASFA would be effective in terms of children’s legal rights rather than in compliance 
with budgetary incentives. We must state that through law children’s due process rights 
can be secured by legally identifying their level o f citizenship while still maintaining the 
protections that come along with being recognized as a minor. Children must still be 
recognized as minors if  we wish to retain the special protections that come along with 
being classified as a “minor” such as keeping court records closed and trying children as 
adults. It will not be possible for children to take responsibility for themselves in rights 
protection; they rely solely on their representatives. It must be legally recognized that 
there are citizens who are entirely dependent on second-hand representation. Our social 
contract does not take this into consideration as it has made the representation o f society 
contingent on legal positivism as Kantean theory has placed high value on autonomy. 
Adults must act to define children’s due process rights through law by first establishing a 
definition of citizenship that addresses citizens as dependents, this can be established 
through a Dependency Clause that is attached to child welfare laws throughout the 
country.
To influence states to adopt child welfare laws with a Dependency Clause it is 
possible for the national legislature to withhold funding for other interests than child
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welfare. Rather than withholding funding to child welfare programs, legislatures could 
withhold funding for such things as highway repair or other legislative interests that do 
not directly harm the children. ASFA provides financial incentives to get states to comply 
with legislative desires, although this does not hurt the program it does not ensure 
protection o f children’s best interests. It is possible that the legislature can tap into other 
legislative interests when trying to get states to comply with desirable policies.
To emphasize the importance o f state responsibility in the welfare o f its citizens 
Mary Ann Glendon in her book. Rights Talk, brought up the concept o f  Programmatic 
rights that currently exist in Europe. Programmatic rights are statements o f public goals 
and aspirations. She agrees with the need to posit the rights of populations o f those who 
are dependent. Glendon states that, “Highly visible acknowledgements o f governmental 
obligations to the aid o f citizens in need and judicial affirmations o f these obligations, 
can help to promote the responsiveness and the responsibility in the political process””’^ . 
Enacting a law or declaration that defines dependents as a certain type o f citizen will then 
commit the state to defining rights, rather than relying on ambiguous terms within 
policies which are shaped and formed according to circumstance.
Alternative solutions have been posited such as various universal declarations 
have already called for the rights o f children, such as in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,”’* but the United States has not actively followed such declarations. In 
order to create and adopt a defined version o f children’s due process rights adults must 
step forward and recognize that no federal legislation exists protecting the due process 
rights of children. Until then, the rights o f children will remain a loose thread in the
Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk. (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 100. 
General Assembly resolution 217 A (III)
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welfare. Once a federal measure is in place, then we will be capable o f review of its 
justness and applicability at the state level. Until then, children’s interests are left to the 
whims o f legislatures, judicial discretion, and political processes, which can vary from 
state to state.
Some also may call for equal rights for children, but this can hurt children by 
taking away much needed protections that the legal status of “child” holds, such as 
making records public or trying children as adults; this does not seem rational. If 
children were given equal rights, their rights will then conflict with parents’ rights and 
the way parents raise children; this seems unreasonable and unattainable.
It may be possible to provide more training to all members that act within the 
juvenile welfare system such as judges, lawyers, representatives and caseworkers. But 
training professionals within a system that has no definitive guideline for due process 
procedure seems futile. Professionals would at the very least be trained in the 
psychology o f children, which will assist in handling o f children but still not effect their 
due process rights. A final alternative that also seems irrational is allowing children to 
seek compensation from the system if  it as been fallible while the child was in State 
custody. This also seems ineffective because it is possible that an enormous number- of 
adults who were previously foster children may seek compensation for perceived 
injustices that may not even have legal backing; this will only create hostility towards the 
system and backlog o f more court cases. It is also impossible to compensate for 
damaging a potential life.
Buss puts it into perspective when she states, “The fault o f the juvenile justice 
system’s design, then, was not in its rejection o f admittedly ill-fitting adult set of
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procedures, but in its failure to replace those procedural requirements with others more 
true to the juvenile justice system.” '”  ^ It is our responsibility as adults to represent 
children and ensure that under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act o f  1899 policies like ASFA 
will function under defined legal rights o f children, not ambiguous phrases like ‘child’s 
best interest’ or ‘reasonable effort.’ The thing about being a ‘child’ is that by definition 
there is little one can do for his or herself.” ® In order to ensure that their needs are met 
and due process rights upheld we must posit through law what rights they do have. Orend 
agrees when he states, “To have a right is to have something more specific and 
meaningful than abstract rightness on one’s side. It is a well grounded and concrete 
claim on the actions o f other people and on the shape of social institutions in particular 
governments.”’ ’ ' As dependent citizens children are incapable o f bringing forth political 
action to insist on definition and protection of rights, therefore as adults we must act in 
their interest and define these rights through federal law, amendment or declaration.
It will be difficult to legally define what children’s legal rights should be without 
conflicting with the already established legal rights of adults. It is to create a law that 
defines partial citizenship that does not rely on, nor require political participation. A law 
defining partial citizenship will contain within it the implication that partial citizens rely 
solely on representation, whieh require special due process protections that fit their 
circumstance as dependents, as determined by the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.
Law has been a significant tool in protection of due process rights. We as 
members o f the social contract must utilize this path of legal recognition in order to
Emily Buss, “The Missed Opportunity in Gault,” University of Chicago Law Review 39, (Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago, 2003), 2.
Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights. Participation and Citizenship. (London: Sage Publications), 3. 
Brian Orend, Human Rights. Concept and Context. (New York: Broadview Press, 2002), 17.
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protect any moral rights and convictions, and to prevent future injustices from occurring 
to abused and neglected children. With reference to ASFA, this act attempts to protect 
undefined rights of children by enforcement o f permanent placement of children within a 
certain time limit without legal force; it merely utilizes budgetary coercion for 
compliance. This is not the way to protect the best interests o f abused and neglected 
children. Positive law can be beneficial in that is acts as a reference point that defines 
and creates a standard. Once a law is set in place it can act as a litmus test that is not 
abstract and if  it is unjust it will can be proven in a court of law.
Until a law sets the standard for state conduct in protection o f dependent children 
as partial citizens, policies enacted will continue to change in their philosophies and 
goals, as has been demonstrated in the Child Welfare Act o f  1980 and ASFA. What needs 
to be recognizes is that if  the State can set a standard for citizens’ conduct then a standard 
must also be set for State conduct. Without legal recognition by a Dependency Clause or 
Law that recognizes children as future or partial citizens there can be no posited child 
rights, and this lack will allow the interpretation o f child rights to differ from state to state 
and policy to policy. Policies will continue to conflict in their objectives, functions, and 
definitions o f children’s rights until we recognize that children as dependents are a 
different “type” of citizen. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act has already implied that 
children are a different type o f citizen by the mere separation o f jurisdiction of courts, but 
nowhere does it state how to properly process dependent, under-age citizens.
The best solution is found in preventative maintenance, and this would be by 
positively identifying children as partial citizens who require parallel due process rights, 
and this could be through adding a Dependency Clause to child welfare laws throughout
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the country. Once a state adopts this clause it is possible that other states might follow its 
example just as other states adopted the Illinois Juvenile Court Act o f 1899. Some due 
process rights afforded to children have been defined under the adult system o f rights yet 
utilized under the children’s system. Children as dependents need due process rights, but 
the current system under which they are receiving due process rights is not affecting the 
situations o f abused and neglected children properly. As has been demonstrated, the 
philosophies o f child welfare policies have conflicted from era to era. Provisions within 
policies do not have the force o f law, leaving children subject to idealistic fads of 
reformers’ philosophies with little legal strength to define and protect rights. The state 
must address the status o f the child as a dependent, who is unable to politically 
participate, by positing child’s legal rights through legal definition o f partial citizenship.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
It has been displayed throughout this thesis that current methods have not been 
able to remedy inefficiencies and injustices in the mishandling of child welfare practices. 
This has resulted in due process rights infringement occurring to children, in our case, 
abused and neglected children. It is a fact that adults have been able to democratically 
represent themselves as citizens through participation with support o f legislation and 
interest groups or through legislative testimony, while children are unable to do so. It has 
been proposed that the alternative is to address the many procedural problems standing in 
the way of children’s rights by defining children as junior citizens via positive law. 
Children are citizens incapable o f effectively expressing themselves politically because it 
is difficult to legally represent themselves. This has allowed for the enactment o f laws 
such as the Adoption Safe Families Act, which were created to protect undefined rights o f 
abused and neglected children. But the ASFA only contains the force o f budgetary 
incentive rather than providing positive legal definition in the protection of child welfare, 
thus never providing parallel due process rights to children.
It has been demonstrated that with regard to juveniles, legal proeesses ean 
function more efficiently with a defined conception o f rights, as according to our 
Constitution; rights that stem from citizenship status. As juveniles, children cannot be 
recognized as equal citizens, thus affecting due process rights definition and protection.
88
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This thesis has shown that it is important that all citizens, no matter the status o f 
citizenship or capability of participation, must have some means o f protecting themselves 
from unchecked government practices. It should be ensured that the state would 
effectively act in everyone’s best interest. If the state can set a standard for conduct o f its 
citizens then a standard must be set for the conduct o f the State as well.
Chapter Two introduced the basis for consideration o f children as citizens by 
addressing the philosophy behind parens patriae. This common law implies that children 
are in fact some sort o f citizen as the state does take interest in their welfare. In the 
second Section o f Chapter Two, it discussed that many influences o f political decision 
makers have been in response to economic, legal, and social trends, rather than in the best 
interest o f children. This key issue has affected views on the status o f citizenship of 
children, increasing the chances for procedural defects that exist today in child welfare 
policies. Focuses primarily on perceived humanitarian philosophies based on moral 
rather than positive law have not assisted in protection of child welfare. Throughout the 
history of child welfare, as has also been revealed in Sections Two and Three, Supreme 
Court decisions have had little success in affecting procedural flaws that many foster 
children face while under state supervision. Section Three then addressed how the 
Juvenile Court Act was enacted to separate the legal status o f children by addressing 
them under a system that recognized children’s needs. It was shown in this chapter that 
philosophies and interests in child welfare have repeatedly gone back and forth on 
assigning adult rights which are not even applicable to juveniles according to the spirit of 
the Juvenile Court Acts.
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It was then shown in Chapter Three that current policies such as the Adoption Safe 
Families Act (ASFA), simply address the expediting of cases through compliance in 
qualifying for funding of care, rather than protecting or defining rights for children 
through positive law. Although policies such as the ASFA attempt to expedite placement 
processes o f  abused and neglected children, they still fail to follow a definitive legal 
standard as to how the state should protect custodial processing of abused and neglected 
children. These policies have only repeated the same mistakes that previous child 
welfare policies have by not providing legal strength in protection of child welfare.
Chapter Three addressed ambiguous terms and weak child welfare policies which 
govern how the state processes abused and neglected children today within policies 
enacted to protect the best interest of children. Neither the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act nor ASFA clearly define what “reasonable efforts” are nor do they define in 
law the “compelling reasons why termination o f parental rights would be in the child’s 
best interests.””  ^ This has provided an example o f shifting organizational logic within 
the child welfare system. Therefore Chapter Three demonstrated that a succinct 
philosophy o f children’s rights requires a legal definition o f child rights in order to 
address child welfare in their best interest. It has been argued that children do deserve 
appropriate due process rights as citizens, regardless o f status. Political incentives that 
protect ambiguous references to rights such as ‘best interests’ or ‘reasonable efforts’ lack 
the force and guidance needed in the protection of child welfare for abused and neglected 
children.
Therefore chapters Two and Three demonstrate that continued mistakes in 
philosophical approaches conflict with the purpose o f the Juvenile Court Act. This has
Child Welfare Project, 1998 State Legislative Report.
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contributed to largely unchecked powers that stem from parens patriae and the Juvenile 
Court Act o f 1899. It must be understood that child welfare policies cannot be used as 
bargaining tools, nor can they rely on monetary incentives to get states to comply in 
protecting the interests o f children. ASFA is just another example o f a policy that does 
not address responsibility for errors in procedure from intake to release, the misconduct 
o f civil employees and child representatives, and the ambiguity o f policy guidelines with 
regard to child welfare. Chapters Two and Three exposed that states’ compliance to 
policy demands through monetary or budgetary incentive are not in the best interest of 
dependent underage citizens who cannot protect themselves.
Chapter Four points out that juvenile justice has functioned without a positive 
legal definition and that the alternative may be enacting positive law in the protection of 
children’s best interests. Chapter Four argued the nature o f the relationship that the state 
has with adults as citizens differs from the relationship the state has with children as 
junior citizens with regard to definition o f legal rights and due process protections. It was 
argued that rather than increasing the opportunity for children to exercise their rights, 
children instead have limited access to due process rights protections due the separating 
o f their status as citizens. The main focus demonstrated that adults, as full-fledged 
citizens, can induce change in the system that affects them, while children lack the power 
to utilize democratic means to initiate and effect change in policy that affects them, 
leaving juvenile law to action without proper oversight. Chapter Four emphasized that 
not all citizens need equal status or rights to have their interests protected.” * It was also 
emphasized that positive law is the next best solution in addressing children’s due
As demonstrated through both the Cruzan and Quinlan cases.
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process issues because law acts as a reference point that acts as a standard o f reviewable 
measure.
The solution o f a Dependency Clause was then given in Chapter Five as it 
addressed issued in citizenship that make it possible for due process rights to provice 
protection for children. What is needed is the recognition o f children as partial or junior 
citizens that do not have the ability to politically participate, this requires due process 
rights that are parallel to the adults system’s. It was shown that even thought the legal of 
children is different from adults, it does not mean that the legal system should lack a 
comparable framework that established guidelines for law; autonomy does not have to be 
a precondition for due process protections. It must be recognized that individuals should 
have a means to make claims that does not require political participation (since 
dependents have no way of participating). Recognition o f the citizenship status of 
children as junior citizens will allow for philosophies within the child welfare system to 
change. Chapter Five addresses that decisions may not be made in the best interest of 
either children or their families or subsequently society in general without powers 
contained within positive law. Legally defining junior citizens through legal provision 
will aid in the assignment of rights appropriate to children, as the current due process 
rights only deal with juvenile issues through adult-based protection.
This thesis has demonstrated that law is the best alternative in defining what is 
expected from the state and its citizens with regard to juvenile justice. Child welfare 
policies have failed in protecting children as citizens. It has not been legally defined how 
children as citizens should be addressed, when placed under the jurisdiction o f a separate 
legal venue. Previous methods have failed as current statistics have shown that the
92
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
amount o f abused and neglected children languishing in the system continues to increase. 
Law establishing an avenue in definition o f what kind of rights children have through use 
o f positive law can act as a measure o f state and civil conduct. This analysis has 
demonstrated that the current philosophy governing children’s rights (or lack thereof) and 
laws protecting their rights conflicts with the function o f our current political system. 
Positive law can set standards not previously set by functioning in setting a standard for 
the state. Positive definition o f children’s due process will provide a means to protect 
much needed due process rights in child welfare; this can be done by establishing 
children as junior citizens.
Without posited child rights, the interpretation of children’s due process rights 
will continue to differ from policy to policy and state to state as philosophies o f society 
shift. Policy guidelines can set the standard for dependent children by establishing and 
recognizing them as junior citizens. Influences o f social trends in policy formation can 
conflict in objective, function, and definition o f children’s rights. We must address the 
issue that children as dependents are a different “type” o f citizen as displayed through the 
Juvenile Court Act. Although child welfare issues have been separated through the 
Juvenile Court, rights afforded to children have still been defined under the adult system 
o f rights, which conflicts with the intention and function of the Juvenile Court Act.
Children should have parallel due process rights because they are people who 
deserve dignity and respect as humans, they are a public interest, and because they are 
junior citizens that are confronted with social contract and the public from the time that 
they are bom. Children as dependents need due process protections, especially if abused 
or neglected; they need rights that address their issues within the juvenile court, not adult
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rights in a child welfare system. When the state takes an interest, as it does under the 
guise o f parens patriae, it implies that the interests are based on a status o f citizenship. 
The current system under which children are receiving due process rights is not justly 
approaching the interests o f abused and neglected children properly. Positing child’s due 
process rights through legal definition can be possible by legally defining junior or partial 
citizenship; this status of citizenship will address dependents which are incapable of 
political participation.
By challenging unstated norms and recognizing that children are social beings, 
who are in fact future citizens, we can recognize that they necessitate defined due process 
rights. The answer is not found in assigning equal rights to children, as it is not possible 
due to the function o f our current system. King states, “It is the very inequality and the 
continuation of this inequality between children and adults which gives children, so to 
speak, a right to rights.”” '' Therefore children should have due process rights because 
they do not have and cannot expect to have full citizen’s rights. The way to children’s 
rights is to first recognize and define children as junior or partial citizens, thus 
establishing special definition and protections, which will in turn define due process 
rights for dependents. It must be recognized that children are social beings, who are in 
fact a special type o f citizen, which necessitate comparable, but not the same, due process 
rights adults; this will lead to a system that can protect the interests and welfare o f abused 
and neglected children more justly and more efficiently. A Dependency Clause that 
recognizes children as non-participating citizens that require due process protections must 
be established.
Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights. Participation and Citizenship. (London: Sage Publications), 13.
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